War or peace on the Indus?

Saturday, April 03, 2010

John Briscoe

Anyone foolish enough to write on war or peace in the Indus needs to first banish a set of immediate suspicions. I am neither Indian nor Pakistani. I am a South African who has worked on water issues in the subcontinent for 35 years and who has lived in Bangladesh (in the 1970s) and Delhi (in the 2000s). In 2006 I published, with fine Indian colleagues, an Oxford University Press book titled India’s Water Economy: Facing a Turbulent Future and, with fine Pakistani colleagues, one titled Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry. I was the Senior Water Advisor for the World Bank who dealt with the appointment of the Neutral Expert on the Baglihar case. My last assignment at the World Bank (relevant, as described later) was as Country Director for Brazil. I am now a mere university professor, and speak in the name of no one but myself.

I have deep affection for the people of both India and Pakistan, and am dismayed by what I see as a looming train wreck on the Indus, with disastrous consequences for both countries. I will outline why there is no objective conflict of interests between the countries over the waters of the Indus Basin, make some observations of the need for a change in public discourse, and suggest how the drivers of the train can put on the brakes before it is too late.

Is there an inherent conflict between India and Pakistan?

The simple answer is no. The Indus Waters Treaty allocates the water of the three western rivers to Pakistan, but allows India to tap the considerable hydropower potential of the Chenab and Jhelum before the rivers enter Pakistan.

The qualification is that this use of hydropower is not to affect either the quantity of water reaching Pakistan or to interfere with the natural timing of those flows. Since hydropower does not consume water, the only issue is timing. And timing is a very big issue, because agriculture in the Pakistani plains depends not only on how much water comes, but that it comes in critical periods during the planting season.

The reality is that India could tap virtually all of the available power without negatively affecting the timing of flows to which Pakistan is entitled.

Is the Indus Treaty a stable basis for cooperation?

If Pakistan and India had normal, trustful relations, there would be a mutually-verified monitoring process which would assure that there is no change in the flows going into Pakistan. (In an even more ideal world, India could increase low-flows during the critical planting season, with significant benefit to Pakistani farmers and with very small impacts on power generation in India.) Because the relationship was not normal when the treaty was negotiated, Pakistan would agree only if limitations on India’s capacity to manipulate the timing of flows was hardwired into the treaty. This was done by limiting the amount of “live storage” (the storage that matters for changing the timing of flows) in each and every hydropower dam that India would construct on the two rivers.

While this made sense given knowledge in 1960, over time it became clear that this restriction gave rise to a major problem. The physical restrictions meant that gates for flushing silt out of the dams could not be built, thus ensuring that any dam in India would rapidly fill with the silt pouring off the young Himalayas.

This was a critical issue at stake in the Baglihar case. Pakistan (reasonably) said that the gates being installed were in violation of the specifications of the treaty. India (equally reasonably) argued that it would be wrong to build a dam knowing it would soon fill with silt.

The finding of the Neutral Expert was essentially a reinterpretation of the Treaty, saying that the physical limitations no longer made sense. While the finding was reasonable in the case of Baglihar, it left Pakistan without the mechanism – limited live storage – which was its only (albeit weak) protection against upstream manipulation of flows in India. This vulnerability was driven home when India chose to fill Baglihar exactly at the time when it would impose maximum harm on farmers in downstream Pakistan.

If Baglihar was the only dam being built by India on the Chenab and Jhelum, this would be a limited problem. But following Baglihar is a veritable caravan of Indian projects – Kishanganga, Sawalkot, Pakuldul, Bursar, Dal Huste, Gyspa… The cumulative live storage will be large, giving India an unquestioned capacity to have major impact on the timing of flows into Pakistan. (Using Baglihar as a reference, simple back-of-the- envelope calculations, suggest that once it has constructed all of the planned hydropower plants on the Chenab, India will have an ability to effect major damage on Pakistan. First, there is the one-time effect of filling the new dams. If done during the wet season this would have little effect on Pakistan. But if done during the critical low-flow period, there would be a large one-time effect (as was the case when India filled Baglihar). Second, there is the permanent threat which would be a consequence of substantial cumulative live storage which could store about one month’s worth of low-season flow on the Chenab. If, God forbid, India so chose, it could use this cumulative live storage to impose major reductions on water availability in Pakistan during the critical planting season.

Views on “the water problem” from both sides of the border and the role of the press.

Living in Delhi and working in both India and Pakistan, I was struck by a paradox. One country was a vigorous democracy, the other a military regime. But whereas an important part of the Pakistani press regularly reported India’s views on the water issue in an objective way, the Indian press never did the same. I never saw a report which gave Indian readers a factual description of the enormous vulnerability of Pakistan, of the way in which India had socked it to Pakistan when filling Baglihar. How could this be, I asked? Because, a journalist colleague in Delhi told me, “when it comes to Kashmir – and the Indus Treaty is considered an integral part of Kashmir — the ministry of external affairs instructs newspapers on what they can and cannot say, and often tells them explicitly what it is they are to say.”

This apparently remains the case. In the context of the recent talks between India and Pakistan I read, in Boston, the electronic reports on the disagreement about “the water issue” in The Times of India, The Hindustan Times, The Hindu, The Indian Express and The Economic Times. (1)

Taken together, these reports make astounding reading. Not only was the message the same in each case (“no real issue, just Pakistani shenanigans” ), but the arguments were the same, the numbers were the same and the phrases were the same. And in all cases the source was “analysts” and “experts” — in not one case was the reader informed that this was reporting an official position of the Government of India.

Equally depressing is my repeated experience – most recently at a major international meeting of strategic security institutions in Delhi – that even the most liberal and enlightened of Indian analysts (many of whom are friends who I greatly respect) seem constitutionally incapable of seeing the great vulnerability and legitimate concern of Pakistan (which is obvious and objective to an outsider).

A way forward

This is a very uneven playing field. The regional hegemon is the upperriparian and has all the cards in its hands. This asymmetry means thatit is India that is driving the train, and that change must start inIndia. In my view, four things need to be done. First, there must be some courageous and open-minded Indians – in government or out – who will stand up and explain to the public why this is not just an issue for Pakistan, but why it is an existential issue for Pakistan.

Second, there must be leadership from the Government of India. Here I am struck by the stark difference between the behaviour of India and that of its fellow BRIC – Brazil, the regional hegemon in Latin America.

Brazil and Paraguay have a binding agreement on their rights and responsibilities on the massive Itaipu Binacional Hydropower Project. The proceeds, which are of enormous importance to small Paraguay, played a politicised, polemical anti-Brazilian part in the recent presidential election in Paraguay. Similarly, Brazil’s and Bolivia’s binding agreement on gas also became part of an anti-Brazil presidential campaign theme.

The public and press in Brazil bayed for blood and insisted that Bolivia and Paraguay be made to pay. So what did President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva do? “Look,” he said to his irate countrymen, “these are poor countries, and these are huge issues for them. They are our brothers. Yes, we are in our legal rights to be harsh with them, but we are going to show understanding and generosity, and so I am unilaterally doubling (in the case of Paraguay) and tripling (in the case of Bolivia) the payments we make to them. Brazil is a big country and a relatively rich one, so this will do a lot for them and won’t harm us much.” India could, and should, in my view, similarly make the effort to see it from its neighbour’s point of view, and should show the generosity of spirit which is an integral part of being a truly great power and good neighbour.

Third, this should translate into an invitation to Pakistan to explore ways in which the principles of the Indus Waters Treaty could be respected, while providing a win for Pakistan (assurance on their flows) and a win for India (reducing the chronic legal uncertainty which vexes every Indian project on the Chenab or Jhelum). With good will there are multiple ways in which the treaty could be maintained but reinterpreted so that both countries could win.

Fourth, discussions on the Indus waters should be de-linked from both historic grievances and from the other Kashmir-related issues. Again, it is a sign of statesmanship, not weakness, to acknowledge the past and then move beyond it. This is personal for me, as someone of Irish origin. Conor Cruise O’Brien once remarked, “Santayana said that those who did not learn their history would be condemned to repeat it; in the case of Ireland we have learned our history so well that we are condemned to repeat it, again and again.”

And finally, as a South African I am acutely aware that Nelson Mandela, after 27 years in prison, chose not to settle scores but to look forward and construct a better future, for all the people of his country and mine. Who will be the Indian Mandela who will do this – for the benefit of Pakistanis and Indians – on the Indus?

The writer is the Gordon McKay Professor of Environmental Engineering, Harvard University. Email: jbriscoe@seas. harvard.edu

(1)

Respectively, http://timesofindia .indiatimes. com/india/Water-Pakistans- diversionary- tactic-/articles how/5609099. cms, http://beta. thehindu. com/news/ national/ article112388. ece, http://www.hindusta ntimes.com/ News-Feed/ india/River- waters-The- next-testing- ground/Article1- 512190.aspx, http://www.indianex press.com/ news/Pak- heats-up- water-sharing/ 583733, http://economictime s.indiatimes. com/news/ politics/ nation/Pak-takes-water- route-to- attack-India/ articleshow/ 5665516.cms

Global Water Trends Afloat Pakistan’s Water Crisis

Water is necessary for human survival and development while water is a scarce good. Conclusively lack of water hinders development and also dignified life. This assessment is obvious from global trends, as well as from Pakistan’s national and local struggles for better access to water.

According to figures available by the United Nations and other international organizations, 1.1bn people are devoid of sufficient access to water, and 2.4bn people have to live with no sufficient sanitation. In keeping to current trends the projection is that about 3bn people of a population of 8.5bn will experience water shortage by 2025. 83% of them will belong to developing countries, more often than not in rural areas where even today now and then only 20% of the population have contact with sufficient water supply. This definite lack of water is contrasting to the academic conclusion that there is enough ground water in all regions of the world to certify plenty of water supplies for all people. Only 6% of global freshwater is used by households, while 20% is utilized industry and another 70% by agriculture. The finale drawn from these framework conditions is that water shortage and the unequal distribution of water are global problems rather than regional problems that need international solutions.

Inadequate supply of drinking water is the foremost cause of diseases in developing countries. Already in 1997, the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development maintained that 2.3bn people suffer from diseases rooted in unsatisfactory water provision and quality. More than five years later, it was anticipated that 2.4bn people were suffering from water related diseases, and the World Health Organization reckons that 80% of all infections are traceable to poor water conditions. 5,483 people die daily of water caused diarrhea – 90 percent are children under five. Taking into credit all water linked diseases and deaths, international organizations estimated in 2001 that 2,213,000 people died because of derisory water supply – ten times more than the tsunami disaster caused in December 2004.

In 1995, UNDP considered Pakistan as country having among the highest water potential per person out of 130 countries that should severely perk up its water situation to prevail over the present crisis and prevent future ones. Obviously, Pakistan failed to make any progress. Subsequently in 2003, the United Nations dropped Pakistan’s ranking, because its overall renewable water resources per capita per year have been predicted as 114th out of 180 countries.

Only three percent of Pakistan’s sweet water resources are consumed for household purposes and drinking. Therefore the dispute on access to water in Pakistan is subjugated by irrigation disagreements, mega-projects of dams and canals, and climate modifications. The focal point is on water for agriculture rather than for people. This production oriented outlook continues in the debate about groundwater use and withdrawal. It is probable that surface water meets only 75-80 percent of crop water requirements. As a result, groundwater is merely seen as a reserve water resource for irrigation and food production, as well as the major factor for the growth of agricultural production in the late 20th century. With regard to the availability of safe and sufficient drinking water, Pakistan lacks reliable statistics. While data about the availability of water and field studies about water quality exist, there is no sufficient data that take both into account. To some extent it is recognized that lacking safe and sufficient drinking water is not a geographical but social problem.

Official records about the access to drinking water vary between 60 and 90 percent of households. In rural areas a decline of households with access to water is documented; figures about accessibility differ between 10 and 53 percent. In addition, having access to water in Pakistan is not parallel to access to safe and sufficient water supply. Pakistan’s water quality ranks as 80th out of 122 nations. The Pakistan Council of Research and Water Resources (PCRWR) estimate that approximately 50 percent of urban water supply is insufficient for drinking and personal use. This research takes information about availability and quality into relation and concludes that an average of 25.61 percent of Pakistan’s 159 million inhabitants have access to safe and sufficient drinking water. This computation shows that in rural areas only 23.5 percent and in urban areas approximately 30 percent can use their source of water without putting at risk their health. These results come close to a conclusion by independent experts who predicted that already in 2001, with prevailing consumption rates and a population growth of 4 million people per year, one out of three people in Pakistan would face dangerous shortages of water, “threatening their very survival”.

Deficient water supply is primarily a local issue rooted in national omissions to address the needs of the people in a sufficient manner. In order to address these issues properly, international advice, cooperation and standard-setting is needed. Human rights and human development are two sides of the same coin that is titled as water crisis. Pakistan spends officially approximately 80 times more into its military than on the provision of water and sufficient sanitation facilities to its people.

In the face of the minimal practical impact of the great number of world conferences, declarations and action programs, this dialogue has sensitized governments and international actors with respect to the issue of water shortage and the human right to water. Because of this sensitization, the institutions, bodies and agencies of the United Nations have been finally talking about the issue of water shortage increasingly from the standpoint of other dying out human rights, such as the right to food, health, shelter, education and development.

Water Shortage Biggest Threat To Pakistan: Book

By Anwar Iqbal

WASHINGTON, Aug 20: Water shortages present the greatest future threat to the viability of Pakistan as a state and a society, warns a new book on Pakistan.

Author Michael Kugelman argues that “while this assertion may be overblown, one can hardly dispute its underlying premise”.

The book points out that Pakistan’s water situation is extremely precarious. Water availability has plummeted from about 5,000 cubic metres per capita in the early 1950s to less than 1,500 per capita today.

According to 2008 data from the Food and Agriculture Organisation, Pakistan’s total water availability per capita ranks dead last in a list of 26 Asian countries and the United States.

The book warns that Pakistan is expected to become water-scarce (the designation of a country with annual water availability below 1,000 cubic metres per capita) by 2035, though some experts say this may happen as soon as 2020, if not earlier.

Mr Kugelman, a programme associate with the Asia Programme at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, warns that several dramatic demographic shifts are intensifying Pakistan’s already-rampant water insecurity.

The book notes that at least 90 per cent of Pakistan’s dwindling water resources are allocated to irrigation and other agricultural needs. This is not entirely surprising, given that Pakistan is an overwhelmingly arid country with an agriculture-dependent economy.

Unfortunately, however, intensive irrigation regimes and poor drainage practices have caused waterlogging and soil salinity throughout Pakistan’s countryside. As a result, vast expanses of the nation’s rich agricultural lands are too wet or salty to yield any meaningful harvests.

With the lion’s share of Pakistan’s limited water supplies dedicated to agriculture, less than 10 per cent is left for drinking water and sanitation.

The book notes that some of the starkest manifestations of the crisis can be found in the parched regions of Sindh. As the country’s population has surged, large volumes of water from the Indus have been diverted upstream to Punjab to satisfy soaring demand for agriculture and for consumption in cities.

“Consequently, downstream in Sindh, the once-mighty Indus has shrunk to a canal, and in some areas shrivelled up to little more than a puddle.”

The river’s disappearance throughout much of Sindh, the book argues, has snuffed out livelihoods throughout the river delta, particularly those of fishermen — who are now forced to gather firewood for a living and to buy their water (at high cost) from trucks.

The book quotes one Pakistani environmentalist as lamenting how the Indus Delta is suffering through “severe degradation”, sparking “coastal poverty, hopelessness, and despair”, causing great damage to the delta’s mangroves and destroying entire ecosystems.

Perhaps the most powerful accelerant of Pakistan’s water crisis is global warming. The Indus River Basin — Pakistan’s chief water source — obtains its water stocks from the snows and rains of the western Himalayas. However, few — if any — areas of the world are suffering from the effects of climate change as much as this legendary mountain region.

Many of its glaciers are already thinning by up to a metre per year. This rapid melting pattern — coupled with another consequence of global warming, high-intensity precipitation — is expected to aggravate river flooding. Once the glaciers have melted, river flows are expected to decrease dramatically.

What does this entail for Pakistan? According to the World Bank, it means an exacerbation of the “already serious problems” of flooding and poor drainage in the Indus Basin over the next 50 years, followed by up to a “terrifying” 30-40 per cent drop in river flows in 100 years’ time.

Courtesy Dawn