Free Website Hosting

Monday, May 30, 2011

Our collective psychosis

 
 


Pakistan’s right wing has flourished on the crutches of a national security doctrine: A world view, which prioritises paranoia and ‘security’ of ideological and geographical frontiers. Never mind if the majority of Pakistanis have no access to water and sanitation or the public education and health systems have virtually collapsed. The events of May 2011 cast a long shadow over the merits of investing in security institutions and fuelling patriotism with conspiracies.
First, the poster-Shaikh of anti-Americanism has been ‘eliminated’ when the mighty guardians were asleep. The new round of WikiLeaks cables reveals anecdotal evidence of civil-military acquiescence to the grand designs of ‘evil’ America, including the nasty drones that kill civilians. And now, the latest attack on a well-guarded naval base and destruction of high-value military equipment has jolted us all.
During May, the militant networks ostensibly inspired by the nihilistic al Qaeda ideology have stepped up acts of terrorism across the country. Yet, the response of the Pakistani right remains locked in the folds of ‘foreign conspiracy’ and fails to review what really ails the polity. The enemy within is still far from being recognised. Even the politicians who are calling for military accountability have little to say about the jihadis waging war against Pakistanis.
It does not matter much when we find out through WikiLeaks that the brotherly countries — Saudia Arabia and United Arab Emirates — and their rich citizens finance terrorist networks. Worse, when the UAE proceeds to hire Blackwater for security, few ‘patriots’ complain. Until yesterday, Blackwater was responsible for all the terror attacks in Pakistan according to the media mujahideen. Even the former chief justice of the Lahore High Court directed the Punjab Police to investigate the role of Blackwater in perpetrating suicide attacks on the widely revered Data Darbar.
I guess Blackwater is kosher now, since a brotherly Arab country has hired its service. Our collective habit of finding bogeys and imagining enemies has turned into a deep psychosis. Many Pakistanis believe that Osama was not there in the Abbottabad compound. Urdu press and TV channels augment this world view and politicians play up the insecurity mantra. The parliamentary resolution of May 12 is another exercise in this collective search for sovereignty, glory and honour. Alas, these days glory is achieved through human development, through trade and investment and not empty rhetoric citing the glorious past of the Muslims.
It is therefore understandable that the oracles on TV sets are blaming the US-India-Israel axis for the attacks on the Mehran Naval Base by chanting the ‘who benefits’ mantra. Now, the Pakistani mind is convinced that the May events are a prelude to a forthcoming attack on our nuclear assets. We are gifted with too many assets: Dozens of militant groups, two Taliban streams and, of course, the nuclear weapons, which will have to be guarded. Never mind the people of this country. They are dispensable as long as honour is preserved. It is time to address the mythologies we have constructed and deal with ourselves before we ‘defeat’ the enemies.
The writer is consulting editor, The Friday Times. 
Published in The Express Tribune, May 26th, 2011.

Things More Important than Sovereignty and Honor

Zia Ahmad
7 days ago, a motley crew of a handful militants raided and occupied a highly sensitive and supposedly heavily fortified Naval air base in Karachi. The ensuing battle lasted for sixteen plus hours at the cost of ten military personnel, fourteen injuries and two surveillance planes. Bear in mind, these are the official numbers. We can’t really blame the people if they find the official toll of damages suspect and assume a higher count of casualties.
It is also said that a contingent of a hundred commandos was deployed to reclaim the naval base. Let’s run the numbers again:
15 – 20 militants
100 “elite” commandos
16 hours of combat
Don’t fault yourself if the numbers don’t add up. Unlike the Abbottabad fiasco, one can bet on incompetence on part of the khakis rather than complicity. The kind of incompetence, as it happens more often than one cares to keep up with, on so many levels that most of us (being the tax payers) have a right to demand if the bloated defense budget is being put to any use.
Now that the Pak Army and ISI have acknowledged a major intelligence failure on the Osama episode, one would have expected them khaki jawans to be on their toes. Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaida didn’t waste any time in promising a fierce backlash in the wake of Osama’s death. That ought to have set all sorts of rainbow colored alarms going around in GHQs of all sizes and shapes. Security and intelligence would have been expected to be an utmost priority. Soon after, a suicide explosion claimed 80 lives at a military training academy near Charsadda. Do we expect the ISPR to issue out another brazen proclamation that nobody was prepared for this.
Last night’s attack and the consequent marathon attempt to reclaim the naval base have done much to dent our confidence in those who are sworn to protect us. What we all ask is if the armed forces can’t protect their assets and indeed themselves, what about us bloody civilians?
It may be too much to ask for the unhealthy fixation with men in khaki amongst the children and adolescents of all ages to wear thin. Our collective amnesia or perhaps the innate tendency to avoid our own grave follies and look the other way (think of episodes as far back as ’71 or as recent as a similar TTP attack on GHQ in ’09) may risk this instance to be sidestepped by some political circus attraction. Even worse, some of the less than bright and more than emotional right wingers would start whining about the drone attacks (wikileaks be damned) and gripe on about the imagined sovereignty and fanciful honor.
Speaking of which, didn’t our dear general make a very “ba-ghairat” claim of not letting anything frivolous such as prosperity compromise our honor. Dear sir, please remember you lead the army of a third world country struggling with drinking water and energy, not the Klingon empire. He also made this claim about breaking the TTP’s back. That was a bit premature sir.
The reverence extended towards the Pak fauj doesn’t show any sign of letting up. TV channels and    certain talking heads go on about reminding how the Pak army is the one of the biggest in the world (its all about the size) and offer one kind of justification or the other. Please sirs and bajees, don’t you think with all the tall and mighty claims, the Pak army should also be expected to fight threats other than Indian in origin. And most of you already think India’s behind TTP so that argument doesn’t bode well.

As for our civil benefectors; Mr Rehman Malik and PM Gilani offer their predictable patterns of condemnation and resolves of fighting on the good fight…or something. Hats off to them for keep issuing those tired old monotonous comments one bad event after the other. And you’ll agree there have been fairly a lot of them over the last couple of years. One thing I always wanted to ask the PM was, if God forbid someone was to bomb his front yard of his residence away, what would be his response….another tired old condemnation. Then again he is authority on what is absurd and what is not.
We ask our esteemed Chief of Staff to reclaim our confidence in our own army. With a grim realization we should brace ourselves for more ugly attacks on something more important than our sovereignty and that is hope.

Meet the new apologists on Pakistan TV channels

By Zia Ahmad
We are already familiar with the rants and tirades of Taliban apologists on TV screens and Op-ed pieces. Enter the Pak Army apologizers. Since the May 2 Abbottabad incident, this lot has come to fore defending, justifying and making excuses for the khakis.
Hasb-e-Haal has been a well received TV show which has enjoyed more than two years of popularity with the masses, owing more to Sohail Ahmed’s alter ego Azizi than the trite and self righteous antics of the respective host. Sure the show’s funny and offers a searing indictment of the social ills and the frustrating corruption and ineptitude of our public institutions and politicians, though it retains a mindset that is borderline reductive and xenophobic.
Of late, since the May 2 Abbottabad incident to be specific, the host Junaid Saleem has been unusually touchy with the fingers pointing at the efficiency of our armed forces. Consider the opening clip from last night’s show where he broached the accusations hurled at khakis after the PNS Mehran attack:




http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REulLJ90m8I

Observe how the host coyly starts offering his opinion on the Mehran attack. A certain convention of the show is to have Azizi refer Junaid Saleem as a Danishwer (scholar) whereas Mr Saleem is expected to play the straight foil to Azizi’s jester. Being the writer of the show himself, the self serving antic may seem rather bloated but since “public” enjoys it so why should I be a spoil sport.
So Azizi cajoles the host to offer his take on the debacle. Mr Saleem prances around for a good two minutes (doing his weakest best to appear neutral) before really saying what he wants to say or what his phantom handlers want him to say demonstrating all the requisite shrieks and bouts of hysteria.

Monday, May 23, 2011

Pakistan’s State of Nature

By AA Khalid
The Hobbesian Narrative
Hobbes is perhaps the most important political philosopher Pakistanis concerned about their country should be reading. Of course it will require a ‘’Desification’’ (or ‘’Pakistanization) of the man’s central work, ‘’The Leviathan’’. The Islamic tradition too has works of political philosophy, we think of Al Farabi, who applied the utopian understanding of Plato’s Republic (the rule of the Philosopher King) to the prophetic experience of the Prophet of Islam as a pre-eminent example.
Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Bajja were more realistic if not pessimistic about politics than Farabi’s enthusiastic application of political Platonism. In fact Tufayl and Bajja seek to return to another strand of the Platonic tradition which is more pessimistic and realistic. For Plato knowledge was power and that is why the Philosopher the individual who possessed that greatest of intellect should rule and be king. However, in another tradition of Platonic theorizing, it is realised the great Philosopher is corrupted by the machinations of politics and inevitably his ideals are sacrificed at the altar of political power. Ibn Bajja’s The Governance of the Solitary is such a work, which is concerned about securing the happiness and integrity of the philosopher in the midst of corruption and strife. Or what about that great philosophical novel, ‘’Hayy ibn Yaqazan’’, where the hero of the philosopher Hayy realises that the greatest and most profound truths of philosophy and faith can never find practical application in the real world because as is the case in modern politics the politican will always manipulate simplistic and populist emotion against the beautifully constructed systems of the philosopher. Both Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Bajja conclude that the philosopher must isolate himself from the world and inevitably the great truths of the sages, philosophers, mystics and rationalists will never find true expression in the real world. To pursue the ‘’Platonic Ideal’’ is a vain pursuit.
There are other great philosophers to consider such as Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina. Likewise, we should consider the Islamic tradition as part of the Greek tradition of political philosophy.
But Hobbes’s work speaks with a profound resonance that one can find etched into Pakistan’s political history. Hobbes ‘’philosophical anthropology’’ shaped his pessimistic consideration of human nature and gave the moral substance of his liberalism. Whereas liberalism is always associated with an optimistic faith in human progress and reason, Hobbes’s liberalism is born out of the trials and tribulations of human suffering and existential pessimism.
This passage that Hobbes wrote in the Leviathan postulating about the existence of mankind in a ‘’State of Nature’’ has profound meaning for Pakistanis struggling to make sense of the anaemic civic and democratic organs of the Pakistani State:
‘’Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’’
And:
‘’ Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man.’’
But we can take issue with Hobbes’s assertion that life is ‘’solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’’. Life in Pakistan is anything but solitary, in a country where clan, tribe and ethnicity as well as feudal and class status (not to mention the existence of the Pakistani caste system) life is a constant trial of membership and trust that one must invest with their respective social group to make any sort of living. Life therefore is poor, nasty, brutish and short but it is not solitary. In Pakistan life is communal and it is from this communality that we derive the brutality, the destruction and the conflict. It is a constant conflict between different groups of the social structure rather than individuals.
As such with the absence of the modern nation state and the rule of law these groups operate virtually in a state of war as seen in the ethnic sectarianism tearing apart Karachi. Pakistan internally is in a neo-Hobbesian state of war. Neo-Hobbesian because the communal dimension of Pakistani public life is something not touched upon by Hobbes, but it is a perfectly logical extension to make.
Absence of Ideology
The failure in Pakistan is a failure of ideology – because there never has been a free exchange of ideas in Pakistan, there never has been any ideological contestation. The major sources of party conflicts in politics are found in family feuds, feudal rivalries and ethnic division. The major conflict in Pakistani politics is between the Zardari/Bhutto clan and the Sharif brothers. There is no universal ideological narrative – everything is constructed on the basis of family name, feudal affiliation and ethnic status. In Pakistan civil war is played out in the democratic process – it is perhaps the formality of the electoral process which prevents outright intra-warfare between different social groups. The party system in Pakistan reflects the essentially tribal nature of Pakistani political culture.
As such labels such as ‘’secular’’, ‘’liberal’’, ‘’progressive’’, ‘’democratic’’ and other categories of modern political philosophy make no sense when applied to Pakistani politics. It is fruitless to talk about ‘’liberals’’ v ‘’conservatives’’ because that was never the conflict in Pakistan.
As such the reductive and simplistic schemes put forward by some commentators on the role of religion in Pakistani public life is unfounded. The great strife and crisis of the Pakistani State has never been to do with religion directly but rather the failure to establish a civic identity and a workable nation-state. It is the machinations of clan, tribe, ethnicity, feudalism and class that determine the major urban conflicts in Pakistan. Religion has been fused with the Machiavellianism of the Pakistani Army to stay in control – religion has always been used cynically in Pakistani society. But if we even imagined a Pakistan without Islam the same problems would still exist today. That is because religious extremism in Pakistan is something not organic to traditional Pakistani society – it has taken a generation of social engineering by the Pakistani Army to produce the sort of religious extremism we see today and still the religious parties in this country do not have any success in the political process. Observers such as Tariq Ali have noted that it is amazing that a theocratic Islamist revolution has not taken over Pakistan given the socio-economic crippling of the Pakistani state, the theological depravity and social engineering of the Army.
Religious radicalism in Pakistan is anarchic it simple exists not only to overthrow the State but undermine the whole structural logic of the Pakistani Hobbesian scheme. The religious radicals can never be successful in taking over Pakistan because of the culture of feudal, ethnic politics and patronage that not only acts as a buffer against religious extremism but also against liberal reforms.
From Geneva to Islamabad
Pakistan is neither a theocracy, a democracy nor any other discernable modern political organism. It is a neo-Hobbesian creature that trundles along with the social glue provided by ethnicity, provincialism, feudal patronage, Army intervention, tribal affiliation and all the associated pre-modern forms of deliberation, negotiation and conflict that defines everyday Pakistani life.
The real crux of the matter in Pakistan is not the unsustainable and in many ways imported religious radicalism from the hard shores of the House of Saud – because this form of extremism is anarchic and in many ways resembles the untenable experiments of European puritans such as Calvin.
Today we see the city of Geneva as the quintessential embodiment of European secularism and social democracy. But Geneva was once the theocratic stronghold of the Protestant Reformation under Calvin. Calvin’s new and charismatic brand of Protestant faith challenged the clerical authority of the Catholic Church but only so that he could implement his vision of clerical rule.
In Calvin’s theocracy we find the same sort of puritanical measures carried out by the modern day Taliban and Wahabbis in Saudi Arabia. A ban on the arts, culture, freedom of expression and an emphasis on strict religious observance which was forced and an insistence on keeping to laws of blasphemy. Calvinism too was based on an absolute and literal understanding of the sovereignty of God and in many ways this deviated from classical Christian understanding as does the understand of the Wahabbi theologians today which echoes the anarchistic theology of the early Kharijites.
The Kharijite understanding was shunned by the classical tradition of Islamic philosophy and law but it nevertheless has had influence on the modern theocratic Islamists such as Sayyid Qutb and Maududi. Where else did the popular slogan of, ‘’ ‘La hukm illa lillah’’come from, which was the essential creed of the Kharijites. This completely went against the teaching on human agency, human fallibility and the imperfection of human nature taught not only by the Sufi mystics, later Islamic philosophers but also by legal theorists like Abu Hanifa who always accepted that his judgements were only fallible opinions and that people could always challenge his legal rulings.
This brief comparative illustration indicates that modern Islam is undergoing a crisis of authority and many of the actions and beliefs seen today in the Muslim World go against the conclusions and scholastic method of the classical Islamic tradition.
From Utopian Ashes To Religious Secularism
Today we are seeing a total breakdown of classical Islam and we should accept that the classical Islamic tradition is all but dead. What has replaced it is a scary and shallow populist charisma espoused by the likes of Maududi and Qutb who never received rigorous classical Islamic training. In many ways the memberships of the theocratic Islamist followers surprisingly come from secular backgrounds. The vast majority of Islamist movements today are not made up of clerics but rather from Muslims with a secular background who are doctors, lawyers and middle class professionals.
But out of the failures of Protestant utopianism and I believe out of the ashes of Pakistan’s unusually violent brand of anarchic theocratic Islamism will arise a religious secularity. American theologians like Roger Williams and European religious intellectuals like John Locke realised out of experience and applying Hobbes philosophical anthropology that Church and State had to be separated to save religion from power hungry tyrants. In the end what can and what is emerging throughout the Muslim World is a distinctly religious understanding of secularism.
A religious logic of secularism arises out of the ashes of religious utopianism. The European experience and more so the American experiences document how religious traditions articulated the powerful moral intuitions associated with liberty, democracy and secularism. It was the success of the theologians and religious intellectuals of America particularly that popularised an accessible understanding of democracy, secularism and liberty.
It is a fact of life as Bertrand Russell said, ‘’ The theoretical understanding of the world, which is the aim of philosophy, is not a matter of great practical importance to animals, or to savages, or even to most civilized men.’’
The social contract theory of the Enlightenment theorists and philosophers is not the reason why most Americans have a deep moral attachment to democracy and liberty. It is because the religious traditions of American have powerfully articulated the moral values required for democratic practice, citizenship skills and given ideas of liberty and secularism a deep moral significance for many Americans. For many like de Tocqueville in his work ‘’Democracy in America’’, it is the biblical theory of Covenant rather than social contract theory which affirms democracy in the hearts and minds of many Americans.
Fundamentalism – A Product of Modernity
As Ashish Nandy has remarked modern day religious fundamentalist movements mark a total break from the scholastic and theological traditionalism of classical religious learning. Hindutva, Zionism , theocratic Islamism are all expression of identity politics couched in religious imagery by individuals who essentially come from secular backgrounds.
Theodor Herzl (the father of Zionism) and Maududi (father of Pakistani theocratic Islamism) were both journalists who came from secular backgrounds but gravitated towards being amateur theologians who mixed powerful religious imagery with clearly secular political goals. Fundamentalism as Khaled Abou El Fadl remarks is a an ‘’orphan of modernity’’.
We are passing through a period of breakdown in the history of Islam in the Pakistani region of the sub-continent. In India and other parts of the Muslim World the story is completely different. In other parts of the world such as Tunisia we have liberal theology flourishing with the likes of Rachid Al Ghannouchi who promote a form of Islamic liberalism. Egypt is more complex – because there are competing theologies such as the Salafis, Islamic liberals, Islamic constitutionalists, legalists, conservatives, pragmatists, reformers and followers of televangelists such as Amr Khaled. The conclusion is that every Muslim society is experiencing some sort of transformation but there are no grand sweeping narratives that can be imposed on each one. Pakistan is in many ways an anomaly in the Muslim World – there is only a crude form of religious anarchism, because the religious liberals and moderates have been persecuted through the instruments and proxies of the Army.
The Army’s State of Nature
The real problem in Pakistan is the role of the Army in public life. This is the elephant in the room that not many Pakistanis talk about. In the English press there are plenty of articles found on criticising the religious establishment but you will not find many criticising the Army directly.
The clerics and madrassas have marginal influence on the daily political discourse in Pakistan. The areas of concentrated political power do not reside with the clerics but within the fierce competition between different social groups. The decline and decay of Karachi is testament to this fact where ethnic sectarianism has destroyed the civic fabric of that city.
We have been looking at the wrong things. The powers of the clerics today, the rise of religious radicalism are all symptoms not causes. The causes lie in the peculiar logic of Pakistani political culture that frustrates and blocks any liberal reform, the causes lie in the failure of the political parties in Pakistan which are nepotistic and despotic, the cause lies in the failure of Pakistani democracy and with the fantastical success of the Pakistani Army that has managed to stay in power through any means necessary. The brutish and neo-Hobbesian nature of the Pakistani political and social fabric is the cause. The reason for today’s ills is because Pakistan has been in a ‘’State of Nature’’, where the sovereignty of the State has been replaced by the Machiavellian logic of Pakistani Army. The Army has played its role in staying in power magnificently by clearly understanding the social logic of the Pakistan and by manipulating the Islamist movements. But of late that tightrope of deceit that the Army tread along has unravelled but for all intents and purposes it seems the Army will consolidate its position again.
The sort of religious thinking present in Pakistan is a symptom of what has gone wrong rather than a cause. It is symptom of the post-colonial failures in Pakistan. When we speak to the older generation they remark with great astonishment the social transformations that have taken place when it comes to faith in Pakistan. The Army’s social engineering has fundamentally altered and distorted religious discourse in this country. Add to this new information from the Wikileaks cables which suggest that clerics in the Punjab have received millions of dollars of funding from the Saudis and UAE and you realise that much of the social transformations that have taken place with regards to faith have been all imported rather than the result of indigenous organic evolution.
The new Wikileaks Pakistan Papers documents the neo-Hobbesian nature of this nation in its full and unrelenting glory. Kayani calls for more drone attacks, Zardari treats the PPP as a play-thing and whoever pleases can come and buy up the allegiance of the Army for the right price of course. How else can we explain the millions of dollars pouring in from the Saudis and UAE into clerical institutions – this can only happen under the auspices of the Army.
Questioning needs to be directed at the centres of concentrated power in Pakistan – it is only recently that the clerics have become such a centre after decades of being sponsored by the Army. Pakistan is a hard country where the real dynamic forces are those of manipulation, ruthless power grabbing and cold calculated political consolidation. The Army and its Generals are ruthlessly utilitarian when it comes to how many Pakistani lives are lost – for them Pakistani lives are mere pennies in the grand calculus of profit.
Beyond the chaos there is a frightening control exerted by the Army, with General Kayani sitting as the unquestionable Pharaoh of Pakistan, who merely chuckles at the bickering of the civilian politicians and humours the democratic system. For all those calling for the Army to enter into a political settlement with civilian there is absolutely no incentive for the Army to do such a thing.

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

The wheat mountains of the Indian Punjab


M. S. Swaminathan
In this file photo workers cover bags of wheat at a godown in Fatehgarh Saheb district of Punjab. Farmers in Punjab contribute nearly 40 per cent of the wheat and 26 per cent of the rice needed to sustain the public distribution system.
The Hindu In this file photo workers cover bags of wheat at a godown in Fatehgarh Saheb district of Punjab. Farmers in Punjab contribute nearly 40 per cent of the wheat and 26 per cent of the rice needed to sustain the public distribution system.
The arrival of large quantities of wheat in the grain markets of the Punjab-Haryana region is a heart-warming sight, while poor storage is a matter of national shame.
It was in April-May 1968, that the country witnessed the wonderful spectacle of large arrivals of wheat grain in the mandis of Punjab like Moga and Khanna. Wheat production in the country rose to nearly 17 million tonnes that year, from the previous best harvest of 12 million tonnes. Indira Gandhi released a special stamp titled “Wheat Revolution” in July 1968, to mark this new phase in our agricultural evolution. The nation rejoiced at our coming out of a “ship to mouth” existence. Later in 1968, Dr. William Gaud of the U.S. referred to the quantum jumps in production brought about by semi-dwarf varieties of wheat and rice as a “green revolution.” This term has since come to symbolise a steep rise in productivity and, thereby, of production of major crops.
Wheat production this year may reach a level of 85 million tonnes, in contrast to the seven million tonnes our farmers harvested at the time of independence in 1947. I visited several grain mandis in Moga, Khanna, Khananon and other places in the Punjab during April 23-27, 2011 and experienced, concurrently, a feeling of ecstasy and agony. It was heart-warming to see the great work done by our farm men and women under difficult circumstances when, often, they had to irrigate the fields at night due to a lack of availability of power during the day. The cause of agony was the way the grains produced by farmers with loving care were being handled. The various State marketing agencies and the Food Corporation of India (FCI) are trying their best to procure and store the mountains of grains arriving every day. The gunny bags containing the wheat procured during April-May 2010, are still occupying a considerable part of the storage space available at several mandis. The condition of the grains of earlier years presents a sad sight. The impact of moisture on the quality of paddy is even worse. Malathion sprays and fumigation with Aluminium Sulphide tablets are used to prevent grain spoilage. Safe storage involves attention to both quantity and quality. Grain safety is as important as grain saving. Due to rain and relatively milder temperature, grain arrivals were initially slow, but have now picked up. For all concerned with the procurement, dispatch and storage of wheat grains in the Punjab-Haryana-Western U.P. region, which is the heartland of the green revolution, the task on hand is stupendous.
Farmers in Punjab contribute nearly 40 per cent of the wheat and 26 per cent of the rice needed to sustain the public distribution system. The legal entitlement to food envisaged under the proposed National Food Security Act cannot be implemented without the help of the farm families of Punjab, Haryana and other grain surplus areas. Farmers are currently facing serious problems during production and post-harvest phases of farming due to inadequate investment in farm machinery and storage infrastructure. The investment made and steps taken to ensure environmentally sustainable production and safe storage and efficient distribution of grains will determine the future of both agriculture in Punjab and national food security.
On the production side, the ecological foundations essential for sustainable food production are in distress. There is an over-exploitation of the aquifer and nearly 70 per cent of irrigated area shows a negative water balance. The quality of the water is also deteriorating due to the indiscriminate use of pesticides and mineral fertilizer. Over 50,000 ha of crop land in the south-west region of Punjab are affected by water logging and salinisation. Deficiencies of Nitrogen, Phosphorous and Zinc are affecting 66, 48 and 22 per cent of soils in Punjab respectively. No wonder factor productivity, i.e., return from a unit of input, is going down. Unless urgent steps are taken to convert the green revolution into an ever-green revolution leading to the enhancement of productivity in perpetuity without associated ecological harm, both agriculture in Punjab and our public distribution system will be in danger. Worried about the future fate of farming as a profession, the younger generation is unwilling to follow in the footsteps of their parents and remain on the farm. This is the greatest worry. If steps are not taken to attract and retain youth in farming, the older generation will have no option but to sell land to real estate agents, who are all the time tempting them with attractive offers. Global prices of wheat, rice and maize are almost 50 per cent higher than the minimum support price paid to our farmers. Our population is now over 1.2 billion and we can implement a sustainable and affordable food security system only with home-grown food.
A disturbing finding of Census-2011 is the deteriorating sex ratio in the Punjab-Haryana region. The female-male ratio among children has come to its lowest point since independence. Already, women are shouldering a significant portion of farm work. If the current trends of youth migrating from villages coupled with a drop in the sex ratio continue, agricultural progress will be further endangered. The prevailing preference for a male child is in part due to the fear of farm land going out of a family's control, when the girl child gets married. I hope the loss of interest in taking to farming as a profession among male youth will remove the bias in favour of male children. I foresee an increasing feminisation of agriculture in the green revolution areas. While the drop in the sex ratio should be halted, steps are also needed to intensify the design, manufacture and distribution of women friendly farm machinery.
Tasks ahead: The first task is to defend the gains already made in improving the productivity and production of wheat, rice, maize and other crops. For the purpose of providing the needed technologies, it will be advisable to set up soon a Multi-disciplinary Research and Training Centre for Sustainable Agriculture at the Punjab Agricultural University, Ludhiana. This centre can be organised under the National Action Plan for the Management of Climate Change developed under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, which includes a Mission for Sustainable Agriculture. Such a centre should initiate a Land and Water Care Movement in the Punjab in association with the farming community. The other urgent task is the promotion of appropriate changes in land use. Over 2.7 million ha are now under rice leading to the unsustainable exploitation of the ground water. Our immediate aim should be to find alternative land use for about a million ha under rice. This will be possible only if farmers can get income similar to that they are now earning from rice. Possible alternative crops will be maize and arhar (Pigeon pea). Quality Protein Maize will fetch a premium price from the poultry industry which is fast growing in the Punjab. Arhar being a legume will also enrich soil fertility as well as soil physical properties. Other high value but low water requiring crops like pulses and oilseeds can also be promoted. At the same time, there could be diversified basmati rice production in over a million ha. In addition to Pusa Basmati 1121 which occupies the largest area now, Pusa Basmati-I (1460) and Pusa Basmati 6 (1401) can be promoted. These have resistance to bacterial leaf blight. Varietal diversity will reduce genetic vulnerability to pests and diseases.
For handling the over 26 million tonnes of wheat which will be purchased during this season, a four-pronged strategy may be useful. First, distribution through railway wagons could be expanded and expedited. One wagon can handle 2,500 tonnes. Currently 30,000 to 40,000 tonnes of wheat are being dispatched each day through wagons. With advanced planning, this quantity can be raised to over 1 lakh tonnes per day. They can be dispatched to different States for meeting the needs of PDS, Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), School Noon Meal Programme, Annapoorna, etc. Second, the present Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and godown storage systems can be improved with a little more investment and planning. In Punjab there are 146 mandis and 1,746 Purchase Points. They could be grouped and their infrastructure improved. Third, storage in modern silos, like the one put up at Moga by Adani Agri-logistics, and another one coming up in Amritsar, should be promoted. This will help to adopt an end- to-end system from the point of view of procurement, cleaning, quality assurance, safe storage and distribution. The cost of building silos to store a million tonnes of food grains may be about Rs.600 crore, if the required land is made available by state governments. An investment of about Rs.10,000 crore would help to establish a grid of modern grain storages with a capacity for storing, in good condition, over 15 million tonnes in the Punjab-Haryana-Western U.P. region. Lastly, export options can be explored after taking steps to make food available to the hungry, as suggested by the Supreme Court. Also, we should ensure that adequate food grains will be available for implementing the proposed Food Security Act. Export should be done only if the global food prices are attractive and if the profit made is distributed as bonus to our farmers, as suggested by the National Commission on Farmers.
It is time that we organise a National grid of grain storages, starting with storage at the farm level in well designed bins and extending to rural godowns and regional ultra-modern silos. Post harvest losses can then be minimised or even eliminated and food safety ensured. Unless the prevailing mismatch between production and post-harvest technologies is ended, neither the producer nor the consumer will derive full benefit from bumper harvests.
(M.S. Swaminathan is Chairman, MSSRF, and Member of Parliament of the Rajya Sabha.)

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Myth-busting the Bangladesh war of 1971


An author discusses her new book about the historical narratives of the 1971 civil war that broke up East Pakistan.

Listen to this page using ReadSpeaker
Guerilla fighters of the Mukti Bahini prepare to bayonet men who allegedly collaborated with the Pakistani army during East Pakistan's fight to become the independent state of Bangladesh [GALLO/GETTY]
Last month, Al Jazeera published an article entitled Book, film greeted with fury among Bengalis. Here, Sarmila Bose, author of Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, responds to the criticism levelled at her work.
In all the excitement about the "Arab spring" it is instructive to remember the 1971 war in South Asia. Then too there was a military regime in Pakistan, easily identified as the "baddies" -  and a popular uprising in its rebellious Eastern province, where Bengali nationalists were reported to be peacefully seeking freedom, democracy and human rights.
When the regime used military force to crush the rebellion in East Pakistan, India intervened like a knight to the rescue, resulting in the defeat of the bad guys, victory for the good guys and the independence of Bangladesh... Or so the story went for forty years. I grew up with it in Calcutta. It was widely repeated in the international press.
Several years ago I decided to chronicle a number of incidents of the 1971 war in-depth. I observed that many Bangladeshis were aggrieved that the world seemed to have forgotten the terrible trauma of the birth of their nation. Given the scale of the suffering, that lack of memory certainly appeared to be unfair, but there did not seem to be many detailed studies of the war - without which the world could not be expected to remember, or understand, what had happened in 1971.
My aim was to record as much as possible of what seemed to be a much-commented-on but poorly documented conflict - and to humanise it, so that the war could be depicted in terms of the people who were caught up in it, and not just faceless statistics. I hoped that the detailed documentation of what happened at the human level on the ground would help to shed some light on the conflict as a whole.
The principal tool of my study was memories. I read all available memoirs and reminiscences, in both English and Bengali. But I also embarked on extensive fieldwork, finding and talking to people who were present at many particular incidents, whether as participants, victims or eye-witnesses. Crucially, I wanted to hear the stories from multiple sources, including people on different sides of the war, so as to get as balanced and well-rounded a reconstruction as possible.
As soon as I started to do systematic research on the 1971 war, I found that there was a problem with the story which I had grown up believing: from the evidence that emanated from the memories of all sides at the ground level, significant parts of the "dominant narrative" seem not to have been true. Many "facts" had been exaggerated, fabricated, distorted or concealed. Many people in responsible positions had repeated unsupported assertions without a thought; some people seemed to know that the nationalist mythologies were false and yet had done nothing to inform the public. I had thought I would be chronicling the details of the story of 1971 with which I had been brought up, but I found instead that there was a different story to be told.
Product of research
My book Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, the product of several years of fieldwork based research, has just been published (Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press). It focuses on the bitter fratricidal war within the province of East Pakistan over a period of a little more than a year, rather than the open "hot" war between India and Pakistan towards the end. It brings together, for the first time, the memories of dozens of people from each side of the conflict who were present in East Pakistan during the war. It lets the available evidence tell the stories. It has been described as a work that "will set anew the terms of debate" about this war.
Even before anyone has had the chance to read it, Dead Reckoning has been attracting comment, some of it of a nature that according to an observer would make the very reception of my book a subject of "taboo studies". "Myth-busting" works that undermine nationalist mythology, especially those that have gone unchallenged for several decades, are clearly not to be undertaken by the faint-hearted. The book has received gratifying praise from scholars and journalists who read the advance copies, but the word "courageous" cropped up with ominous frequency in many of the reviews. Some scholars praised my work in private; others told me to prepare for the flak that was bound to follow. One "myth-busting" scholar was glad my book was out at last, as I would now sweep up at the unpopularity stakes and she would get some respite after enduring several years of abuse.
Scholars and investigative journalists have an important role in "busting" politically partisan narratives. And yet, far too often we all fall for the seductive appeal of a simplistic "good versus evil" story, or fail to challenge victors' histories.
So far the story of valiant rebels fighting oppressive dictators in the so-called "Arab spring" has had one significant blemish - the vicious sexual attack and attempted murder of CBS foreign correspondent Lara Logan by dozens of men celebrating the downfall of Hosni Mubarak in Tahrir Square in Cairo. It initially vanished from the headlines and has still not led to the kind of questioning of the representation of such conflicts that it should have generated. "Tahrir Square" became shorthand for freedom and democracy-loving people rising up against oppressive dictators.
People in other countries started to say they wanted their own "Tahrir Square". Logan has given a brave and graphic account of what happened to her at the hands of those supposedly celebrating the fall of a dictator and the coming of freedom, democracy and human rights. Her life was saved by burqa-clad Egyptian women and she was rescued by soldiers. Her account endows "Tahrir Square" with an entirely different meaning.
It should caution us against assuming that all those opposing an oppressive regime are champions of non-violence, democracy or human rights. It should alert us to the complexities of political power struggles and civil war, and stop getting carried away by what we imagine is happening, or would like to happen, rather than what the evidence supports.
Such was the impact of the 1971 war on South Asians that the year has transformed into a shorthand for its particular symbolism: 1971, or ekattor, the number 71 in Bengali, has come to stand for a simple equation of a popular nationalist uprising presumed to embody liberal democratic values battling brutal repression by a military dictatorship. But was it really as simple as that? Over time, the victorious Bangladeshi nationalist side's narrative of Pakistani villainy and Bengali victimhood became entrenched through unquestioned repetition.
The losing side of Pakistani nationalists had its own myth-making, comprising vast Indian plots. Pakistan had been carved out of the British Empire in India as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims. It was a problematic idea from the start - a large proportion of Muslims chose to remain in secular and pluralistic India, for instance, and its two parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, were separated by a thousand miles of a hostile India. In 1971 the idea of Islam as the basis of nationhood came apart in South Asia along with the country of Pakistan, after a mere 23 years of existence. What went wrong? And what do the memories of those who were there reveal about the reality of that war?
The publication of Dead Reckoning has spoiled the day for those who had been peddling their respective nationalist mythologies undisturbed for so long. Careers have been built - in politics, media, academia and development - on a particular telling of the 1971 war. All the warring parties of 1971 remain relentlessly partisan in recounting the conflict. As the dominant narrative, which has gained currency around the world, is that of the victorious Bangladeshi nationalists and their Indian allies, they stand to lose the most in any unbiased appraisal. Unsurprisingly therefore, the protests from this section are the shrillest.
Mixed reaction
The reaction to the publication of Dead Reckoning by those who feel threatened by it has followed a predictable path. First, there has been an attempt to damn the book before it was even available. Apart from random rants on the internet - which provides opportunity for anyone to rail against anything - reports have been written by people who haven't read the book, citing other people who also haven't read the book. The reason for this may be summed up as the well-founded fear of "knowledge is power".
When people read the book they will be far better informed as to what really happened in 1971. Hence the desperate attempt by those who have been spinning their particular yarns for so long to try to smear the book before anyone gets the chance to read it. A few people also seem to be trying to laud the book before reading it, an equally meaningless exercise. These commentaries are easy to dismiss: clearly, those who haven't read the book have nothing of value to say about it.
Second, detractors of the book claim that it exonerates the military from atrocities committed in East Pakistan in 1971. In reality the book details over several chapters many cases of atrocities committed by the regime's forces, so anyone who says it excuses the military's brutalities is clearly lying. The question is - why are they lying about something that will easily be found out as soon as people start reading the book? The answer to this question is more complex than it might seem. Of course the detractors hope that by making such claims they will stop people from reading the book.
Part of the answer lies also in that the book corrects some of the absurd exaggerations about the army's actions with which Bangladeshi nationalists had happily embellished their stories of "villainous" Pakistanis for all these years. But an important reason for falsely claiming that the book exonerates the military is to distract attention from the fact that it also chronicles the brutalities by their own side, committed in the name of Bengali nationalism. The nature and scale of atrocities committed by the "nationalist" side had been edited out of the dominant narrative. Its discovery spoils the "villains versus innocents" spin of Bangladeshi nationalist mythology.
A key question about the "controversy" over Dead Reckoning is why this book is stirring such passions when other works do not. One reason for this is that there are precious few studies of the 1971 war based on dispassionate research. This is the first book-length study that reconstructs the violence of the war at the ground-level, utilising multiple memories from all sides of the conflict.
Two eminent US historians, Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, published the only research-based study of the war at the diplomatic and policy level twenty years ago. Their excellent book, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (University of California Press, 1990), challenged the dominant narrative, but their work does not seem to be known among the general public as much as within academia.
However, a crucial reason for the special impact of Dead Reckoning has to do with who the author is. I am a Bengali, from a nationalist family in India. As Indians and Bengalis our sympathies had been firmly with the liberation struggle in Bangladesh in 1971. The dominant narrative of the 1971 war is the story as told by "my side", as it were. My reporting of what I actually found through my research, rather than unquestioningly repeating the partisan narrative or continuing the conspiracy of silence over uncomfortable truths, is thus taken as a "betrayal" by those who have profited for so long from mythologising the history of 1971.
It is important to note that not all South Asians subscribe to the myth-making. One eminent Indian journalist thought that my "courage, disregard for orthodoxy and meticulous research" in writing Dead Reckoning made me "the enfant terrible of Indian historians". A senior Bangladeshi scholar has found it "fitting that someone with Sarmila's links with Bengali nationalism should demonstrate that political values cannot be furthered by distorting history."
South Asians are prone to conjuring up all manner of conspiracy theories when faced with unpleasant realities, but those looking for one for Dead Reckoning are at a loss, as the only explanation for what it contains is that it reconstructs what really happened on the basis of available evidence.
The process of dismantling entrenched nationalist mythologies can be painful for those who have much vested in them, but the passions stirred by the publication of Dead Reckoning has sparked the debate that the 1971 war badly needed - and set on the right course the discussion of this bitter and brutal fratricidal war that split the only homeland created for Muslims in the modern world.
Sarmila Bose is Senior Research Fellow in the Politics of South Asia at the University of Oxford. She was a journalist in India for many years. She earned her degrees at Bryn Mawr College (History) and Harvard University (MPA and PhD in Political Economy and Government.)
Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War is published by C. Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Pakistan's Yuppies in Danger

Pakistan’s small middle class is vulnerable and exposed to the growing violence between al Qaeda and the government. Novelist Lorraine Adams on why this vital group cannot be forgotten by the U.S.
Ever since Osama bin Laden’s demise, I’ve been worried about PUPPies—Pakistani Upwardly Mobile Urban Professionals. They’re a vulnerable and endangered species, despite their Twitter accounts, iPhones, and Facebook pages. College-educated Pakistan (roughly 4 percent of the country’s 170 million people) may be much smaller than Egypt’s, and may have different gripes with their government, but its members share many values with their Arab counterparts. As the news broke over Twitter last week, PUPPies had plenty to say about the death of the man hiding in an ugly house in a town most of them remembered as a decidedly uncool childhood vacation spot. (Think of the Adirondacks or Catskills, if you’re a New Yorker.) They know that terrorists keen on retaliatory strikes for bin Laden’s killing will be looking for them.
Article - Adams Pakistan Yuppies Rizwan Tabassum / Getty Images Some writers—among them my friend the novelist Mohsin Hamid and the Guardian’s Declan Walsh and Jason Burke—are familiar with this sliver of Pakistan’s middle class. But most, including Salman Rushdie, who called for declaring Pakistan a terrorist state, sometimes seem to believe in a monolithic Pakistan sympathetic to terrorism, intolerantly Islamic and anti-West. They say the military, which represents the largest component of the middle class, is guilty of harboring bin Laden. If they have their way, the Pakistanis who are most like Westerners—English-speaking folk who carry Blackberries, watch Fashion Week on YouTube, twittered against the murder of anti-blasphemy law crusader Salman Taseer, and obsess about grades for college or medical school—will be thrown to the terrorist pack.
Since 2006, I’ve been traveling to Pakistan to research my last novel and the novel I’m currently writing. I’ve spent time in the border town of Torkham, the Swat Valley, the garrison town Ralwapindi, but mostly in cities—Peshawar, Islamabad, and Lahore. When I first started visiting these were tranquil places. But in 2008, Lahore exploded with its first suicide bombing. Pakistanis from all walks of life became vulnerable, but terrorists have targeted places where tolerant Muslims gather, such as urban shopping centers, Sufi shrines, and cricket fields.
“This day marks mixed feelings of triumph and fear—triumph over the death of a common enemy but fear that darker times marked by fundamentalist backlash and the withdrawal of American support may have begun.”
Rushdie and others, perhaps rightly, blame the Pakistani military for hiding bin Laden, but side by side with this possibility is the statistical reality that middle-class families have born the brunt of the extremist attacks. Officers and soldiers at military training grounds, employees at the federal investigative agency that probes terrorist attacks (comparable to our FBI), and individual police officers have been victims of fatal bombings. The military is not monolithic. One of my Lahore friends is the daughter of a high-ranking officer in the Frontier Corps who is Pathan. If stereotypes were a guide, both her ethnicity and her father’s career mark her family as bin Laden sympathizers. But her uncle, a police chief, was killed by a suicide bomber in Peshawar because of his anti-extremist work.  Plus, her sister-in-law’s family is longtime military, the family patriarch an Army general who hails from Abbottabad. Yet whenever both these young women are on Facebook, their updates decry these attacks.
Monday, less than 24 hours after the bin Laden operation, a couple of my Pakistan friends in their 20s—an orthodontist and a medical school student—were far more sober than their American counterparts. These women are devout Muslims (they adhere to virginity before marriage and never drink), but like their counterparts in Tahrir Square, are enlightened observers. One wrote: “We got Osama! But remember that this justice has come at the cost of a decade of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While America, by virtue of its 'wealth and power' may be relatively immune, for Pakistan, this day marks mixed feelings of triumph and fear—triumph over the death of a common enemy but fear that darker times marked by fundamentalist backlash and the withdrawal of American support may have begun.”
Said another, “It shows that our military is either incompetent or complicit. Either way, the world is unhappy with Pakistan. We're sitting in the corner wearing a dunce cap yet again. The Taliban is unhappy with Pakistan. If anything, we'll be seeing more blasts in the coming months. If they had kept him alive, that would have helped fight them. It's too soon to say for sure what's going to happen next. At the most, this is a moral victory for 9/11 families. But my 2c—it doesn't help fight the terrorists which are multiplying by the day.”
Just how much support Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and the military gave to bin Laden or any extremists is the subject of government investigation, and has been debated ad nauseam among analysts. Most American commentators quote the highly respected Ahmed Rashid, who recently wrote in The New Republic that they give terrorists enough help to keep “the pot boiling but not overflowing.” Others such as Anatol Lieven, in his new book about Pakistan, argue that military support for extremists in Kashmir and Afghanistan exists but inside Pakistan is thin.
Either way, life for Pakistan’s educated—because the government is such a corruption-saturated institution—is not much better than it is for its poor. Except for one, yes one, hospital in Karachi, medical care is far below international standards. Country-wide, the lack of utilities, even in urban areas, leads to absurdist predicaments. One of my friends, the mother of a 4-month-old, was trying to give him a hot bath in January. An absence of natural gas for the water heater led her to innovate. She got an electric kettle and plugged it in, transferring a teapot of hot water into the tub. But then, the electricity was cut off—Pakistan doesn’t have enough, and major cities regularly have 16 hours a day without it—and the tub was far from full. “Oh crap,” she said in frustration. I remember looking over at the bedroom bookshelf visible from her bathroom; there was an Orhan Pamuk, Daniyal Mueenuddin, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and others. For all her thoughtfulness and spirit, she was living with problems plenty of slum dwellers in the United States rarely face. Later that day, talking about the situation, she told me, “It’s not for me to question. If I question I create problems. Why do that? It’s better to accept it.”
In these days after bin Laden’s killing, I hope her stoicism continues to keep her sane. Whether it keeps her safe is up to leaders, worldwide and in Pakistan, for whom she is largely invisible.
Lorraine Adams, a Pulitzer Prize-winning author and reporter, is the author of Harbor and The Room and the Chair. She lives in New York City.

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Whither Labour Rights

The Friday Times
By Yasser Latif Hamdani
The 18th Amendment to the constitution was welcomed by all who want to see Pakistan a truly federal, progressive and democratic state where the federating units and the centre are balanced in terms of power and rights. Pakistan vests residuary powers in constituent units but the net thrown by the federation – federal and concurrent legislative lists – was so wide that residuary powers amounted to very little. The abolition of the concurrent list devolves real powers to the provinces.
Be that as it may, the parliament has erred by devolving the very important subject of labour to the provinces without saving any powers for itself. This has come as a significant blow to the workers. In all democracies – including staunchly capitalistic countries such as the United States of America – national labour unions and associations form a crucial political counterweight to the industrial and landed classes. There is a big question mark on the legal position of All Pakistan Trade Unions. Pakistan needs a constitutional left movement, and by devolving the labour sector to the provinces, the narrow-sighted politicians have ensured that the democratic left – already in the ICU – is euthanised immediately. In doing so, the Pakistan People’s Party has dug its own grave at the national level.
Nowhere has this been more acutely felt than in the province of Punjab, where the provincial government, heavily dominated by big business interests, has enacted a patently anti-labour act called the Punjab Industrial Relations Act 2010 (PIRA). Section 3(1) of the PIRA abolishes the right of workers to form unions in an establishment that employs less than 50 workers. Consider, for example, how many workers a single brick kiln employs. Not only is this law ultra vires section 17(1) of the constitution, but is in violation of Pakistan’s international obligations of labour rights. Even the jurisdiction of labour courts is questionable, as they are appointed by the provincial government without any interference of the provincial high court. Under Pakistan’s separation of powers doctrine, a judicial body has to be appointed through a mechanism that gives the higher judiciary a say. Sooner or later, all decisions by the labour courts will be subject to legal challenge on this ground alone.
Even where there are unions, outside representation on a union’s executive body has been reduced from 25% to 20%. Unions have long relied on ideological and academic support from this section and this has been crucial in union politics. By reducing their number, the provincial government has smoothened the jagged edges for employers. Even more serious is the by-passing of the Collective Bargaining Agent – a central feature of the Industrial Relations legislation in the past – allowing the employer to negotiate directly with an individual worker. In other words, the industrial employers of Punjab have been given a ready made device to divide and rule the workers and defeat any and all moves by the workers to organise for their rights.
The cumulative effect of these changes is that labour rights have been read out effectively from law. Not since the Industrial Revolution has the legal position been so bleak in our part of the world as under this law. The law – as it existed under the various Industrial Relations Ordinances promulgated by military dictators – included an elaborate mechanism which allowed the government, workers and employers to resolve disputes. This too has been omitted. Additionally, there is no mechanism for routine inspections, making enforcement of minimum wage in the province next to impossible.
Pakistan’s constitution talks great game about elimination of exploitation (Article 3), making provisions for securing just and humane conditions for work (Article 37 e), ensuring equitable adjustment of rights between employers and employees (Article 38 a), facilities for work and adequate livelihood with reasonable rest and leisure (Article 38 b), social security and social insurance etc (Article 38 c), and food, clothing, housing, education and medical relief (Article 38 d). But everything the PIRA has achieved is the exact opposite.
Sher Shah Suri – who achieved a level of development unparalleled in his time – had famously said that peasants and workers are the backbone of any empire and should be kept happy at all costs. We have failed miserably to live up to that glorious example from our past. Workers in Pakistan in general and Punjab in particular are the most oppressed lot in all of South Asia. Labour unions are a natural pressure valve for societies. Those who allow this valve to operate properly avoid bloodshed, revolutions and social unrest. Great Britain is perhaps one of the best examples in this respect, where the labour class was coopted and made a stakeholder in national progress, politics and governance.

Where’s Hillary?

Hasidic paper breaks the rules by editing Clinton out of White House photo

By Joe Pompeo
Hillary Clinton's expression, right hand clasped over her mouth in astonishment, is largely responsible for making the above photo iconic--and, to at least one newspaper, sexually suggestive.
In the photo, President Obama and his national security team are huddled around a conference table in the White House Situation Room, watching CIA director Leon Panetta narrate last Sunday's raid on Osama bin Laden's compound. The mood is clearly tense.
When Women's Wear Daily consulted a coterie of photo editors and designers about why the image is "destined to be one for the history books," Clinton was foremost in their responses.
"The Hillary Clinton expression is the one that holds the photograph fully," Time's photo director told the magazine. "You can see 10 years of tension and heartache and anger in Hillary's face," Conde Nast's Scott Dadich agreed.
Turns out she was probably just coughing during that crucial moment captured by White House photographer Pete Souza. But nevertheless, the image still proved a bit too racy for at least one of the many newspapers that printed it.
That would be the Ultra-Orthodox Hasidic broadsheet Der Tzitung, published in Brooklyn. The paper photoshopped Clinton, as well at the only other woman who could be seen in the room--Audrey Tomason, the national director of counterterrorism--out of the frame.

"Apparently the presence of a woman, any woman, being all womanly and sexy all over the United States' counterterrorism efforts was too much for the editors of Der Tzitung to handle," noted the prominent women's blog Jezebel.
Indeed, "The Hasidic newspaper will not intentionally include any images of women in the paper because it could be considered sexually suggestive," Rabbi Jason Miller explains in The Jewish Week. Though he notes that the publication's "fauxtograpphing" may in fact be a graver act against their religious tenets: "To my mind, this act of censorship is actually a violation of the Jewish legal principle of g'neivat da'at (deceit)."
Beyond that, Der Tzitung's editors apparently missed or blatantly ignored the guidelines stipulated on the official White House Flickr page, where the photo was released for use by news organizations: "The photograph may not be manipulated in any way."
The White House has not issued a response on the altered image.
UPDATE: The editors of Der Tzitung have apologized to the White House for altering the photo and responded to the Wasington Post with a comment clarifiying their position:
"In accord with our religious beliefs, we do not publish photos of women, which in no way relegates them to a lower status... Because of laws of modesty, we are not allowed to publish pictures of women, and we regret if this gives an impression of disparaging to women, which is certainly never our intention. We apologize if this was seen as offensive."

Saturday, May 7, 2011

Can the World Feed 10 Billion People?

With an exploding global population -- and Africa's numbers set to triple -- the world's experts are falling over themselves arguing how to feed the masses. Why do they have it so wrong?

BY RAJ PATEL

The world's demographers this week increased their estimates of the world's population through the coming century. We are now on track to hit 10 billion people by 2100. Today, humanity produces enough food to feed everyone but, because of the way we distribute it, there are still a billion hungry. One doesn't need to be a frothing Malthusian to worry about how we'll all get to eat tomorrow. Current predictions place most of the world's people in Asia, the highest levels of consumption in Europe and North America, and the highest population growth rates in Africa -- where the population could triple over the next 90 years.
There are, however, plans afoot to feed the world. One of the countries to which the world's development experts have turned as a test bed is Malawi. Landlocked and a little smaller than Pennsylvania, Malawi is consistently among the world's poorest places. The latest figures have 90 percent of its 15 million people living on the equivalent of less than two dollars a day. By century's end, the population is expected to be nearly 132 million. Today, some 40 percent of Malawians live below the country's poverty line, and part of the reason for widespread chronic poverty is that more than 70 percent of Malawians live in rural areas. There, they depend on agriculture -- and nearly every farmer grows maize. "Chimanga ndi moyo" -- "maize is life," the local saying goes -- but growing maize pays so poorly that few people can afford to eat anything else.
If you arrive in Malawi in March, just after the rainy season, growing food seems like a fool's game. It's hard to find a patch of red soil that isn't a tall riot of green. From the roadside you can see maize about to ripen, with squash and beans planted at the base of the thick stalks. Even the tobacco fields are doing well this year. But there's a rumble in this jungle. Malawi's swaying fields are a battleground in which three different visions for the future of global agriculture are ranged against one other.
The first and most venerable development idea for Malawi sees these farmers as survivors of a doomed way of life who need to be helped into the hereafter. Oxford economist Paul Collier is the poster child for this "modernist" view, one that he presented in a scathing November 2008 Foreign Affairs article in which he cudgeled the "romantics" who yearned for peasant agriculture. Observing both that wages in cities are higher than in the countryside, and that every large developed country is able to feed itself without peasant farmers, Collier argued the virtues of big agriculture. He also called on the European Union to support genetically modified crops and for the United States to kill domestic subsidies for biofuel. He was one-third right: biofuel subsidies are absurd, not least because they drive up food prices, siphoning grains from the bowls of the poorest into the gas-tanks of the richest -- with limited environmental gains, at best.
Collier's contempt for peasants seems, however, to rest on something other than the facts. Although international agribusiness has generated great profits ever since the East India Company, it hasn't brought riches to farmers and farmworkers, who are invariably society's poorest people. Indeed, big agriculture earns its moniker -- it tends to work most lucratively with large-scale plantations and operations to which small farmers are little more than an impediment.
It turns out that if you're keen to make the world's poorest people better off, it's smarter to invest in their farms and workplaces than to send them packing to the cities. In its 2008 World Development Report, the World Bank found that, indeed, investment in peasants was among the most efficient and effective ways of raising people out of poverty and hunger. It was an awkward admission, as the Bank had long been trumpeting Collier's brand of agricultural development. Farmers organizations from Malawi to India to Brazil had been pointing out that access to land, water, sustainable technology, education, markets, state investment in processing, and -- above all, access to level playing field on domestic and international markets -- would help them. But it took three decades of lousy policy for the development establishment to realize this, and they're not quite there yet.
Because of its colonial legacy, Malawi had long been following conventional economic wisdom: exporting things in which the country had a comparative advantage (in Malawi's case, tobacco) and using the funds to buy goods on the international market in which it didn't have an advantage. But when tobacco prices fall, as they have of late, there's less foreign exchange with which to venture into international markets. And being landlocked, Malawi also faces higher prices for grain than its four neighbors -- Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania -- simply because it costs more to transport into the country. According to one estimate, the marginal cost of importing a ton of food-aid maize is $400, versus $200 a ton to import it commercially, and only $50 to source it domestically using fertilizers. Particularly at a time when food and fertilizer prices are predicted to rise, Malawi is wise to consider how vulnerable to the caprices of international markets it wants to be.
This partly explains why, in the late 1990s, almost a decade before it became fashionable, Malawi bucked the advice of its international donors and decided to spend the majority its agriculture budget on fertilizer, the first and perhaps most necessary ingredient in prepping the soil for producing viable crops. The government gave farmers a "starter pack," with enough beans, improved seeds, and fertilizer to cover about a fifth of an acre. International donors weren't pleased. A USAID official decried the program as consigning farmers to a "poverty treadmill" in which farmers would be stuck growing just enough maize to survive, but never enough to get rich. Although the program had modest success, it took off when Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika expanded the program over the 2005-2006 growing season, quadrupling the amount of fertilizer available. Although driven by domestic political promises, his international timing was perfect -- he was embarking on a policy whose time had come. And this is why what happens in Malawi's fields today matter so much beyond its borders.
To understand why, we need a quick history of agricultural policy in developing countries. Many developing countries were, especially before World War II, pantries to be raided by their colonizers. Post-independence, rural areas were often net contributors to government revenues, but there were some assurances of stability, with government schemes to buy crops at guaranteed prices. Internationally -- especially in Asia -- the post-war era saw governments pressured to feed a restive population that was increasingly wondering whether their lot wouldn't be improved through socialism and a change in land ownership. In order to fight the Cold War in foreign fields, the U.S. government and key foundations invested heavily in agricultural technologies such as improved seed and fertilizer. These technologies were designed to keep land in the hands of its feudal owners, food plentiful, and communists at bay. In 1968, William Gaud, the USAID administrator, dubbed it a Green Revolution, because it was designed to prevent a red one.
For a range of mainly geopolitical reasons, the Green Revolution was implemented with less fervor and success in Africa than in Asia. The International Fertilizer Development Center observed in 2006 that $4 billion worth of soil nutrients were being mined from the African soil by farmers who, struggling to make ends meet, weren't replenishing the nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorous in the ground beneath their feet.
The prescription for declining soil quality lay, however, not in addressing the policy causes of farmer's environmental panic -- a systematic neglect since the 1980s to which the World Bank itself admitted in an internal evaluation -- but to fix the soil with technology. So in 2006, the Rockefeller Foundation (the original sponsors of the Green Revolution in Asia) joined the Gates Foundation to launch The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, or AGRA. This is the second brave new development policy that hopes to feed Africa.
AGRA claims to have learned the lessons of history, rejecting Collier's view and focusing on policies that "unlike the Green Revolution in Latin America, which mostly benefited large-scale farmers because they had access to irrigation and were therefore in a position to use the improved varieties ... [are] specifically geared to overcome the challenges facing smallholder farmers."
So did it work in Malawi? It depends on the goal. If the aim was to increase output, then yes. Although economist and Earth Institute Director Jeffrey Sachs recently over-egged the data by suggesting that production had doubled because of the fertilizer subsidy (it only increased by 300,000 - 400,000 tons or up to 15 percent, the rest being mainly due to the return of the rains), the amount of maize in Malawi has undoubtedly gone up.
As the 50 million people food insecure in the United States know all too well, though, having enough food in the country doesn't necessarily mean that all people get to eat, and Malawi still has more than its fair share of glassy-eyed and underweight children. Chronically hungry kids have low height for their age and the number of children malnourished in this way -- "stunted" is the term in the statistics -- has remained stubbornly high since the subsidies began.
Measuring increased yields of maize from fertilizer and starter kits doesn't necessarily translate into a society that is well-fed and economically viable in terms of agriculture. Rachel Bezner Kerr, a professor of geography at the University of Western Ontario who also works in Malawi as a project coordinator for the Soils, Food and Healthy Communities Project, isn't surprised. "Any nutritionist would scoff at the notion that increased yield automatically leads to increased nutrition," she says.
Bezner Kerr told me that having more crops in the fields and bigger yields can actually be a bad thing, taking "women out of the home and away from domestic work. Particularly if they are doing early childcare feeding, this can lead to poorer nutritional outcomes." What happens within the household is crucial in translating increased output into better nutrition.
Indeed, gender matters when it comes to food and farming. Sixty percent of the world's malnourished people are women or girls. Yet the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization recently pointed out that by increasing access to the same resources as men, women could boost their farm's output by up to 30 percent, leading to a 4 percent increase in total agricultural output in developing countries. In Malawi, 90 percent of women work part time, and women are paid some 30 percent less than men for similar jobs. Women are also burdened with care work, especially in a country ravaged by HIV/AIDS. Even if they own land and have access to the same resources as men, women find themselves torn between the demands of child and elder care, cooking, carrying water, finding firewood, planting, weeding, and harvesting.
These problems are better addressed through social change -- abetted by programs like the Soils, Food and Healthy Communities Project -- than chemistry. Yet these are precisely the kinds of programs that are crowded out by fertilizer subsidies. The fertilizer program has been a jealous child, sucking resources away from other programs. The opportunity cost of fertilizer for farmers is money that might have been spent on something else -- a serious concern when global fertilizer prices are going through the roof. Research by the World Bank in Latin America and Southeast Asia has suggested that it's smarter for government to subsidize public goods like agricultural research and extension services and irrigation, rather than directing money at private inputs like fertilizer.
Again, this matters beyond Malawi's borders, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The world's population growth is scheduled to be driven by "high fertility countries" -- most of which are in Africa. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, recently argued that the world might be better fed not by pumping the soil with chemicals, but by using cutting-edge "agroecological" techniques to build soil fertility, and using policy to achieve environmental and social sustainability. In a review of 286 sustainable agriculture projects in 57 developing countries covering 91 million acres, a team led by British environmental scientist Jules Pretty found production increases of 79 percent -- again, far higher than the fertilizer subsidy in Malawi, and with a far broader range of ecological and social benefits than increased food production.
These programs succeed, in part, because they don't see hunger as the consequence of a surfeit of peasants or a deficit in soil, but as the result of complex environmental, social, and political causes. You don't just need chemists to solve hunger -- you need sociologists, soil biologists, agronomists, ethnographers, and even economists. Paying for their skills is the opportunity cost of spending precious dollars on imported fertilizer. Of course, agroecology is an entirely different paradigm than one in which technology is dropped into laps from foreign laboratories accompanied by a sheet of instructions. The programs require much more participatory education work, and much more investment in public goods, than the Malawian government and donors currently seem inclined to provide.
Agroecology is the third development vision battling for the future. In Malawi, it works. By growing cowpeas and groundnuts with maize -- expanding the range of crops -- Bezner Kerr's program has beat the fertilizer program's yield by 10 percent and increased nutrition outcomes too. Yet even agroecology has its limits. Fifteen percent of Malawians remain ultra poor, living on less than a dollar a day and unable to buy enough to eat. They tend to be people who are landless, or who have poor quality land and have to sell their labor at harvest time, just when they need it the most. They remain untouched by the Malawian miracle.
The future doesn't look terribly promising for agroecology. Concerned about the financial sustainability of its fertilizer subsidy program, the Malawian government is about to embark on a Green Belt project, in which thousands of acres will be irrigated to induce foreign investors to begin large-scale farming of sugar cane and other export crops. The foreign exchange brought in by this program, it is hoped, will bankroll the fertilizer spending. The result will help balance the country's current account, but as a consequence, thousands of smallholders are scheduled to be displaced to clear lands that will attract the kind of large-scale agriculture of which Collier would approve.
Particularly in the light of the new population projections for the 21st century, it seems foolish to stick to 20th century agricultural policy. Recall that the agroecological interventions in Malawi turned on women's empowerment. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has famously argued that there are few policies better placed to improve individual, family, and community lives (and lower fertility rates) than education -- particularly the education of women and girls. The prophesies presented to us by demographers vary widely -- change the assumptions, and you end up with a world of between 8 billion and 15 billion people. No matter what the future holds, though, it's clear that a world in which everyone gets to eat depends on women's empowerment -- and rather than treating that fact as something irrelevant to feeding the world, agroecology puts it right in the middle.
A great deal of past agriculture policy has been designed either economically to bomb villages in order to save them, or to administer a technological quick fix in order to postpone politics. Collier wants to get rid of peasants. New fads want to keep them, but keep them knee-deep in chemicals. Yet if we are serious about feeding the hungry, in Malawi or anywhere else, we need to recognize that the majority of the hungry are women, and that we need more public, not private, spending on those least able to command rural resources. Because when it comes to growing food, those who tend the land are anything but fools.