Religious Right in Their Own Words; Apostasy Punishment, Jihad and the Role of Non Muslims in the Land of Infidels

UNANIMITY ON PUNISHMENT FOR APOSTASY
While no simple or unanimous definition for a Muslim was given by all the ulamas, they were clearly unanimous about the punishment for apostasy in an Islamic state. The punishment for apostasy was unequivocally, death.
With this doctrine, the religious leaders were clearly referring the then foreign minister Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan. If Chaudhry Zafrullah had not inherited his present (Ahmadi) beliefs, but had voluntarily elected to become an Ahmadi, he ought to be put to death.
However, while the punishment for apostasy was unanimous, the ulamas could not agree on who exactly is an apostate. Remember various criteria that was narrated by various leaders on who constitutes a Muslim? Now the same uneasy differences were making it hard for the leaders to decide who ought to be put to death.
Maulana Shafi Deobandi said that if he were the head of state of an Islamic Government, he would “exclude those who have pronounced Deobandis as kafirs from the pale of Islam and inflict on them the death penalty if they come within the definition of murtadd, namely, if they have changed and not inherited their religious views”.
The commission further quizzed Maulana Shafi Deobandi on the genuineness of the Deobandi fatwa that declared Asna Ashari Shias as kafirs and murtadds. Maulana Sahib himself made an enquiry on this fatwa from Deoband, and received a signed copy of the aforementioned fatwa, which not only verified the genuineness of that fatwa, but went on to say that “those who do not believe in the sahabiyyat (revering the original companions of the Holy Prophet) of Hazrat Siddiq Akbar and who are qazif (guilty of making vile comments) of Hazrat Aisha Siddiqa (wife of the Holy Prophet, and daughter of Hazrat Siddiq Akbar) and have been guilty of tehrif (distorting the meaning) of Qur’an are kafirs”.
Another Alim, Mr. Ibrahim Ali Chishti, who had studied that topic, believed that Shias are Kafirs as they believe that Hazrat Ali (the fourth caliph and prophet’s cousin) shared the prophethood with the Holy Prophet Muhammad. Mr. Chishti however refused to answer if any Sunni changed his views and becomes a Shia, ought to be put to death or not.
The confusion of the Muslimness and right to kill the apostates led the justices to remark yet again that:
“According to the Shias all Sunnis are kafirs, and Ahl-i-Qur’an; namely, persons who consider hadith to be unreliable and therefore not binding, are unanimously kafirs and so are all independent thinkers. The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim”.
But the answers of the religious right about indiscriminate killing of the apostates had the Justices wondering about what kind of religion do these fanatic alims really represent? The positive treatment for anyone who uses independent thinking or reasoning to accept Islam, vs. the death sentence for someone who uses the reasoning to reject Islam would cast Islam as a fanatical religion, and “an embodiment of complete intellectual paralysis”. The justices pointed out that the “Quran again and again lays emphasis on reason and though, advises toleration and preaches against compulsion in religious matters”.
If anything, the chilling confusions of the political Islam that would soon strangle the new state of Pakistan, were on full display in the pages of the Munir-Kiyani Report.
PROPAGATION OF OTHER RELIGIONS
So what about the right for the non Muslims to preach kufr (way of the infidels) in an Islamic State?.
There was a broad unanimity of what to do in this case. No faith other than Islam could be preached in an Islamic State. Maulana Moudoudi had by that time written a full pamphlet on the case for apostates in an Islamic State. Since many of the alims were considering the other sects to be non Muslims already, implication was that the “non Muslim sect” would also not be allowed any proselytizing in the “Islamic” state. Case in point, the words of Ghazi Siraj-uddin Munir when question on the point:
“Q.—What will you do with them (Ahmadis) if you were the head of the Pakistan State?
A.—I would tolerate them as human beings but will not allow them the right to preach their religion”.
THE CONCEPT OF JIHAD
The interviews turned towards the doctrine of Jihad, and began focusing on the concepts related to Jihad and how they correspond to modern international problems such as international criminal jurisdiction, international conventions and rules of public international law.
Let’s get some definitions first here: An Islamic State is dar-ul-Islam (The House of Islam) where “ordinances of Islam are established and which is under the rule of a Muslim sovereign. Its inhabitants are Muslims and also non-Muslims who have submitted to Muslim control and who under certain restrictions and without the possibility of full citizenship are guaranteed their lives and property by the Muslim State. They must, however, be people of Scriptures and may not be idolaters. An Islamic State is in theory perpetually at war with the neighbouring non-Muslim country, which at any time may become dar-ul-harb, in which case it is the duty of the Muslims of that country to leave it and to come over to the country of their brethren in faith”.
Maulana Moudoudi, one of the foremost brains behind the political Islam movement in Pakistan had this to say about his idea of dar-ul-harb (house of infidels).
“Q.—is a country on the border of dar-ul-Islam always qua an Islamic State in the position of dar-ul-harb?
A.—No. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Islamic State will be potentially at war with the non-Muslim neighbouring country. The non-Muslim country acquires the status of dar-ul-harb only after the Islamic State declares a formal war against it”.
Introduction of potential war against Dar-ul-Harb causes further complications. According to the shorter encyclopaedia of Islam, when a country becomes a dar-ul-harb (belonging to the infidels), it is the duty of all Muslims in that country to leave that country en-masse and migrate to the dar-ul-Islam. Wives who refuse to accompany their Muslim husbands in migration would be ipso facto divorced.
The obvious reference here was India where forty million Muslims were residing and if Pakistan were to become an Islamic state, those Muslims suddenly had an obligation according to these learned Maulanas to move to Pakistan.
 I would slightly digress here, and point out that most of the religious right bitterly opposed Pakistan. In fact, some of the very interviewees called vile names for Pakistan and its founder before the independence in 1947. But such are the expediencies in the name of religion that the same country is now being hailed as an Islamic fortress and home to all Muslims in India by the same religious leaders. Why? Because India was now the land of the infidels. And the country they opposed tooth and nail to form was now being considered the land of the pure.
 Coming back to the interviews, another question was asked now to the alims; what to do with the prisoners of war in case of a battle between the Dar-ul-Islam and Dar-ul-Harb. Maulana Qadri’s remarks were quite close to other replies:
 “Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam?
A.—Yes.
 Q.—Does it differ in fundamentals from the present International Law?
A.—Yes.
 Q.—What are the rights of a person taken prisoner in war?
A.—He can embrace Islam or ask for aman, in which case he will be treated as a musta’min. If he does not ask for aman, he would be made a slave”.
The religious leaders also mentioned that ghanima (plunder) and khums (one fifth of the enemy property) were a necessary incident of a Jihad.
SO WHAT MUSLIMS UNDER THE KAAFIR GOVERNMENTS OUGHT TO DO?
 But then, the justices asked the alims about what the non Muslims ought to do in a land governed by kafir governments. Mr. Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari opined that “it is not possible for a Musalman to be a faithful citizen of a non Muslim state”. When asked that if it was possible for the forty million Muslims of India to be faithful towards India, his reply was “no”.
 So much for condemning the Indian Muslims as traitors in the land of their birth; but the Muslim right wing leaders were not just showing their poor understanding of the formation of modern nationalist identities; in their enthusiasm to divide the world in the believer vs. the non believer realms, they were condemning the Muslims living in non Muslim majority areas to a life of discrimination that they were eyeing for their very own minorities.
 Justice Munir and Kiyani asked a simple question: If an Islamic state was to discriminate against its non Muslim population, would the religious leaders be fine if India treats its Muslim minority the same way. Some sample answers are given below:
 Moudoudi: “Certainly. I should have no objection even if the Muslims of India are treated in that form of Government as shudras and malishes and Manu’s laws are applied to them, depriving them of all share in the Government and the rights of a citizen. In fact such a state of affairs already exists in India”.
 Qadri:  “No objection to Muslims treated under a Hindu government as malishes and shudras under the law of Manu”.

Ghazi Siraj Uddin Munir:
Q.—Do you admit for them the right to declare that all Muslims in India, are shudras and malishes with no civil rights whatsoever?
A.—We will do our best to see that before they do it their political sovereignty is gone. We are too strong for India. We will be strong enough to prevent India from doing this.
Q.—Is it a part of the religious obligations of Muslims to preach their religion?
A—Yes.
Q.—Is it a part of the duty of Muslims in India publicly to preach their religion?
A.—They should have that right.
Q.—What if the Indian State is founded on a religious basis and the right to preach religion is disallowed to its Muslim nationals?
A —If India makes any such law, believer in the Expansionist movement as I am, I will march on India and conquer her.”
  
CONCLUSION
 The rampant confusion, the bloody ideologies and inherent discrimination in the political Islam shone through these interviews. We were lucky that we were able to document this confusion just seven years after our country was born. We were lucky that the designs of the religious right, with all their splendid confusion were laid bare by two respected Jurists of the new nation in such clear terms.
 We were terribly unfortunate to consign this document into the archives of our history, under the dust of the long 55 years, never seriously reading the message that screamed through these pages again and again. That fusing this chaotic medieval ideology with the newly formed state was a recipe for disaster. That the religious right, in its profound fanaticism, would become a catalyst for destruction, for Pakistan and across the world. That sooner Pakistan moves firmly towards a secular, equal for all humans, and democratic Pakistan envisioned by its founder, the better it would be for its future generations. Jinnah’s August 11, 1947 speech figures prominently in the Justice Munir and Kiyani Report. A forgotten and uncomfortable speech for many in the new state, right wing or not, who somehow saw Pakistan as an Islamic state and nothing more.
 I end this series again with more moving words by the late Justices. All of the material for this series has been taken from this report that is widely available on the internet (1). This series covers just a few, not all, of the interviews and their transcripts. I encourage all the readers to read pages 195 to 250 in particular, from where most of the interviews were reproduced.
 “Pakistan is being taken by the common man, though it is not, as an Islamic State. This belief has been encouraged by the ceaseless clamour for Islam and Islamic State that is being heard from all quarters since the establishment of Pakistan. The phantom of an Islamic State has haunted the Musalman throughout the ages and is a result of the memory of the glorious past when Islam rising like a storm from the least expected quarter of the world—wilds of Arabia—instantly enveloped the world, pulling down from their high pedestal gods who had ruled over man since the creation, uprooting centuries old institutions and superstitions and supplanting all civilisations that had been built on an enslaved humanity…………..
 He (the Musalman) therefore finds himself in a state of helplessness, waiting for someone to come and help him out of this morass of uncertainty and confusion. And he will go on waiting like this without anything happening. Nothing but a bold re-orientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the Musalman into a citizen of the present and the future world from the archaic in congruity that he is today….
 It is this lack of bold and clear thinking, the inability to understand and take decisions which has brought about in Pakistan a confusion which will persist and repeatedly create situations of the kind we have been inquiring into until our leaders have a clear conception of the goal and of the means to reach it. 
And as long as we rely on the hammer when a file is needed and press Islam into service to solve situations it was never intended to solve, frustration and disappointment must dog our steps. The sublime faith called Islam will live even if our leaders are not there to enforce it. It lives in the individual, in his soul and outlook, in all his relations with God and men, from the cradle to the grave, and our politicians should  understand that if Divine commands cannot make or keep a man a Musalman, their statutes will not.”
 Concluded

Poets and Hawks: On Pak India War Hysteria

 by Farooq Sulehria

Once again Pak India peace dialogue is underway, this time between the foreign ministers. Too much is posted and published on the various aspects of Paki India relations, basic issues, Kashmir conflicts, the newly hyped water conflict etc etc.

Here we are adding a literary angle of what poets and intellectuals think on that. As their perspectives better represent the humanitarian and culturally and historically rooted understanding. The article is from the weekly viewpoint ezine, a re-launching of the 70’s Viewpoint magazine of renowned progressive and intellectual Mazhar Ali Khan. (aliarqam)

Poets and hawks by Farooq Sulehria
War hysteria in India-Pakistan is a cyclical phenomenon that hits these countries every five-to-eight years.
The attacks on Bombay by black-hooded gunmen once again drove both countries to madness last time. Every time this hysteria afflicts India-Pakistan, both states lose sanity and reason goes into exile. Hawks, bearded and saffron, absolutely rule the roost in their respective countries. Absurdity reins supreme.
Since both countries possess nuclear bombs, the freemasonry of across-the-border jingoists never forgets to make nuclear threats. During the Kargil conflict, the two states exchanged nuclear threats at least thirteen times in three months.
While in India, ‘Hate Pakistan’ is a saffron mission that Sangh Parivar has taken upon itself to accomplish, in Pakistan, teaching hatred for ‘Hindu’ India is literally part of school textbooks. Thus the State ensures that its citizens are indoctrinated in hating ‘Hindu’ India. Politicians assert their patriotic credentials by exhibiting their hawkishness.
A ‘confidential memorandum’ penned soon after the creation of Pakistan by Sir Feroz Khan Noon, who later became Prime Minister, ahead of his meeting with US ambassador, reveals the state/establishment mindset: ”The Mussalmans in Pakistan are against Communism. The Hindus have an ambassador in Moscow, Mrs Pandit, who is the sister of the Hindu Prime Minister in Delhi, Mr Nehru, and the Russians have got an ambassador in Delhi, the Hindu capital. We the Mussalmans of Pakistan have no ambassador in Moscow nor is there any Ambassador in Karachi…. our capital. If USA helps Pakistan to become a strong and independent country… . then the people of Pakistan will fight to last man against Communism to keep their freedom and preserve their way of life”.
Even Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, considered Pakistan’s most intelligent and least provincial leader, was obsessed with India. Otherwise an avid Nehru reader, Bhutto vowed a ‘thousand-year-long war’ against India. In 1974 , when India went nuclear, Bhutto vowed to build A-bomb even if it meant ‘eating grass’: Ghas khaiN gay, atom bomb banainN gay (will eat grass but will build a bomb). If such was Bhutto’s phobia, political dwarfs like Nawaz Sharif, two-times prime minister and head of the right- wing Muslim League, can be excused for celebrating ‘ Yum-e-Takbeer’ to mark the anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear blasts.
Even when the cyclic fit of war hysteria has subsided, there is no escape from the war-mongering media and mosques. Media and mosque compete in demonising ‘Hindu’ India.
Let’s got to, for instance, Rawalpindi’s Jamia Mosque Ghousia. A taped fiery-as-usual speech by Hafiz Saeed, to mark Kashmir Day, is being played through high-pitched loudspeakers: “The holiest soil on earth is that of Pakistan and we cannot tolerate the unholy presence of Nancy Powell on our holy land. Her presence keeps us away from Allah’s blessings. Pakistan should cleanse itself from her unholy existence… Allah has told us to make atom bombs, America is telling us not to. Who should we listen to as Muslims, Allah or America? Kashmir will not be solved by talks, not by American arbitration, not by its division but only by jihad, jihad, jihad!… The Hindus were terrorists yesterday, they are terrorists today and they will remain terrorists tomorrow. We are right in seeking revenge from these spawns of evil.”
While the mosque is understandably a bearded domain, the puritans also dominate the Pakistani media, particularly the vernacular press. Inflammatory statements make front-page headlines, penetrate personalised columns and are editorialised.
The press is particularly a Jamaat-e-Islami sphere and columnists like Abdul Kadir Hassan take pride in declaring themselves ‘ Maulana Mudoodi kay PaoN ki Khak” (dust of Maulana Mudoodi’s feet). Hence, it is no surprise if JI chief Qazi occupies four front page columns to “tell you that Muslims should not rest in peace until we have destroyed America and India.”
Mercifully, even if Hafizs and Qazis dominate mosque and media in Pakistan, the hearts and minds of Pakistan’ s ordinary people have always been captivated by her Dervish poets: Faiz and Daman, Jalib and Ayaz.
Faiz Ahmed Faiz, awarded the Lenin Peace Prize in 1962 , has become such a legend that even Jamaat-e-Islami posters carry his verses while right-wing rags like Nawa- i-Waqt publish supplements on the anniversary of his birth. No such luck during his life time! He was a permanent scourge tormenting the authorities. Hence, he was regularly gaoled and forced to go in exile.
Due to his mass popularity, the authorities attempted to assimilate him. His humanism and commitment to peace, however, would not be reconciled with authorities busy building a confessional state. The authorities, ruling at gun point instead of fostering unity through democratic means, wanted to overcome internal differences by creating an external threat: ‘ Hindu India’.
Faiz refused to subscribe to any such nation-building project. Hence, when Pakistan went to war, whether in 1965 or 1971 , Faiz upheld the flag of peace and refused to jump on the patriotic bandwagon. Recalling the two wars, he later said: ”These two were difficult periods for me because I was under a great deal of pressure to write war songs, but I said, ‘Look here, I am not writing any war songs!’. They said, ‘Well, why not ? It is your patriotic duty.’ I said, ‘Look, firstly, because I consider these wars to be a very wanton waste of precious lives and secondly, because I know that Pakistan is not going to get anything out of either this war or that war. I am not going to write any war songs.’ But Faiz did write poems for peace during both these wars.
During the 1965 war, he composed ”Elegy” for a fallen soldier. And also ”Blackout”:
Since our lights were extinguished
I have been searching for a way to see;
my eyes are lost, God knows where.
You who know me, tell me who I am,
who is a friend, and who an enemy.
A murderous river has been unleashed
into my veins; hatred beats in it.
Be patient; a flash of lightning will come
from another horizon like the white hand of Moses
with my eyes, my lost diamonds.
During the second war, he wrote ”Stay Away from Me” and ”The Dust of Hatred in my Eyes”.
The later was written from the point of view of East Pakistan (which later achieved independence to become Bangladesh) where Khakis, assisted by Jamaat-e-Islami brigades, launched a planned genocide. Faiz hailed from West Pakistan and refused to accept this massacre in his name.
He asked:
How can I embellish this carnival of slaughter,
how decorate this massacre? Whose attention could my lamenting blood attract?
There’s almost no blood in my rawboned body and what’s left isn’t enough
to burn as oil in the lamp, not enough to fill a wineglass.
It can feed no fire, extinguish no thirst.
There’s a poverty of blood in my ravaged body,
a terrible poison now runs in it. If you pierce my veins,
each drop will foam as venom at the cobra’s fangs.
Each drop is the anguished longing of ages’ the burning seal of a rage hushed up for years.
Beware of me. My body is a river of poison.
Stay away from me. My body is a parched log in the desert.
If you burn it, you won’t see the cypress or the jasmine,
but my bones blossoming like thorns in the cactus.
If you throw it in the forests, instead of morning perfumes,
you’ll scatter the dust of my sneared soul.
So stay away from me. Because I’m thirsting for blood.
According to Faiz himself, ”Well that naturally infuriated these people even more. So for a few days, I was obliged to go underground in Sindh and not to stay with the wrath of my patriotic friends.”

Legendary Sindhi poet Shiekh Ayaz

Sindh was not merely sheltering Faiz. Shaikh Ayaz also had to go in hiding there. Considered the greatest Sindhi-language poet in modern times, Shaikh Ayaz also refused to become hysterical when the war drums began beating.
He instead addressed Narayan Shyam, his Hindu friend and fellow Sindhi-language poet, living across the border, and said:
“Hey sangram! samhoon Aa Narayan Shayam!
Hina ja munhinja qola bi saGya, Bmola bi saGya, Hoo kavita jo kaaka-dharni, para munhinja ranga-ratola bi saGya
DHatu bi saGyo, DHolu bi saGyo, hanou bi saGyo, hola bi saGya.
Huna tay keean bandooka KhaRNa maan!
hina Khay golee keean haRNa maan! keean haRNa maan! keean haRNa maan! keean haRNa maan!”
(“There in front of me is Narain Shayam! His tales and mine are the same, our promises are the same, He is the king of poetry, but my colourful ways are also the same Land also same, beloved also same, heart also same, horrors also same How can I point a gun at him! How can I shoot him! How can I shoot! How can I shoot! How can I shoot!”)

Ustad Daman

A Lahori-Punjabi, Ustad Daman was a member of Indian National Congress. Despite an invitation by Pandit Nehru, he did not migrate to India. He was put behind bars by both Khakis and the democratically elected Bhutto for the dangerous views he would articulate in poems that would travel across Pakistan:
Wahgay naal Attari dee nai takar
Na Geeta naal Quran dee aay
Nai kufr Islam da koi jhagra
Sari gaal aay nafay nuksan dee aay
(Wagah and Attari do not exchange blows Nor do Gita and Quran engage in a fight Between apostasy and Islam, there is no bickering Only profit and loss must always be kept in sight)

Sahir Ludhiany

Fortunately, on the other side of Wagah, in India Sahir Ludhianvi (a laureate of the Lenin Peace Prize) reciprocated Daman, Faiz and Ayaz:
Khon apna ho ya praya ho
Nasl-e-Adam ka khon hei akhir
Jang mashriq main ho kay maghrib main
Amn-e-alam ka khon hei Akhir
(Whether you kill an enemy or your own kin/ It is the blood of humanity that sheds/Whether war is in the east or the west/ After all, it bloodies world peace)
Bum gharron per gerain kay sarhad per
Roh-e-tameer zakhm khati hei
khait apnay jalain kay auroon kay
Zeest faqoon say tilmilati hei
(Whether bombs fall on homes or target the frontiers/ Victim is the spirit of advancement/When fields, whether they belong to us or the others, are set on fire/Life suffers hunger)
Tank agay barhain kay peechay hatain
Banjh dharti ki kookh hoti hei
(Whether the tank moves ahead or retreats/ It makes the earth’s womb infertile).
Fatah ka jashn ho kay haar ka saog
Zindgi mayatoon pay rooti hei
(Whether you celebrate victory or lament a loss/ Life mourns at the funerals).
Jang to khud hee aik masla hej Jang kya masloon ka hal dey gee Aag or khoon aaj bakhshay gee Bhook or ehtiaj kal day gee
(War itself is a problem/ What solutions can it offer/ Today it will cause bloodshed and fire/Tomorrow, it will bring hunger and need).
Iss leay aay shrif insano
Jang talti rahay to behter hei,
Aap or hum sabhi kay aangan main
Shama jalti rahay to behtar hei.
(Therefore, O gentle folks/ It’s better that war keeps getting deferred/It’s better the candle keeps burning/ In your homes and ours).
Source; Viewpoinonline

Zia's long reach

By: Quddus Mirza

The Pakistani state no longer forces the country’s artists to comply with stringent political or moral diktats – but it doesn’t have to.

“We live in a postmodern age, everything is simulation, everything is reference, even dictatorships.”
– Dubravka Ugresic

Salima Hashmi’s “In Spite of Wrath 2”, 1987

A young man writes a love letter to his fiancé, and adds a line or two about the government of his country. He posts the letter, but soon after dispatching he realises that if it is opened in the censor office, he is going to suffer because of the casual negative remark he made. In order to avoid such consequences, he decides to apply for a job in the censor department, so he can try to get hold of his letter. To his surprise, he does indeed get a position, and thus starts learning his new tasks. Several months later, during the course of normal post-checking, he finally comes across his letter. He opens it and reads the content. But instead of hiding it or throwing it away, he writes a note that the sender of the letter has committed a crime against the state and must be punished.

This short story by Luisa Valenzuela, the Argentine author, illustrates how the system of censorship seeps into the very souls of those it affects. The ultimate grip and success of censorship occurs when it becomes part of one’s internal system; and, like termites, it corrodes the insides, till one day it destroys the body it has occupied. Subsequently, censorship becomes the normal, natural state, such that one is no longer aware of its presence, as one’s thoughts, words, art and acts are perpetually filtered through a new sense of carefulness.

Pakistani society has faced multiple forms of censorship during its short period as a nation-state. In fact, censorship has been a constant characteristic and tool of successive Pakistani regimes. But during the second last military rule, from 1977 to 1988, this became a particularly prominent presence. The regime of that time, headed by Zia ul-Haq, was known for monopolising religion and manipulating ethics in order to justify its existence. As such, censorship, the control over information and knowledge, was considered an essential weapon in order to maintain order and keep power.

Floral patterns
It is important to recall how an autocratic regime such as Zia’s related to matters of morality. After all, the censorship during Zia’s period was primarily focused on moral issues –the representation of human figures, particularly of women, and the depiction of nude bodies, both male and female. This emphasis on morality – or, alternatively, on sexuality – was hardly surprising, given that the regime sought legitimacy in Islam, and common belief was subsequently used as a stick with which to curb ‘immoral’ behavior and expression. Hence, religion was interpreted in such a way that, for an ordinary citizen, faith was reduced to decrees relating to the representation of the female body, for which state-enforced conditions were in effect for the female presence in print media, film, theatre, television (which at that time was only the state-run channel) and in the visual arts. Indeed, there seemed to grow something of an official obsession with the female body, or at least with certain parts of it. If during a television play, for instance, a woman was depicted as drowning, it was essential that she must be shown in dry clothes the moment she was rescued and emerged from the water. Similarly, if a girl was sleeping on a bed, she needed to have a properly folded dupatta on her chest at all times.

That kind of fascination (in the guise of prohibition) manifested in another form for the print media. Film advertisements illustrating the exposed parts of legs, arms, the navel or some cleavage would be officially covered with cross-hatched black-pen lines – often resulting in some interesting floral patterns, clearly the outcome of whatever bored individual was tasked with checking and censoring all the newspapers and magazines. Likewise, cinema was censored in such a manner that, in foreign movies, two mouths coming close to each other to kiss would suddenly begin to drift away, since the film censor board had clipped the shots of the actual kiss in the movies but provided enough time for the audience to guess at the lost presence of a kiss.

These policies led to some perverse solutions. For instance, movies were made about the ‘purity of love’ between a brother and sister, yet the song sequences and other movements betrayed the clear undercurrent of romantic and even amorous passion. Similarly, during the heyday of overt censorship, a few theatres specialised in showing specifically the censored portions of foreign films. This became such a normal practice that, in a single week in the early 1980s, two cinemas in Lahore were running the same movie (Naked Fist) but in two different versions – the censored portions in one and the uncensored parts in the other.

For the visual arts, the practice of censorship spread to unprecedented levels. It was not possible to display female nudes in public spaces, so artists relied on private galleries or simply showed in their studios or homes. Yet even this was considered offensive, and when the Karachi-born Colin David exhibited nude paintings at his house in Lahore in 1990, members of the student wing of a religious political party invaded the event and destroyed several works. In another notable incident, in 1984, Iqbal Hussain was not allowed to exhibit his canvases, depicting the prostitutes of Lahore, at Alhamra, the state-run gallery; in protest, he put his paintings on the roadside near the Alhamra Art Gallery.

The other component of state censorship was, of course, connected to political matters. During the late 1970s, after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had been hanged and his Pakistan People’s Party and other political groupings had been banned, any reference to political issues – in the arts, literature, theatre or media – was considered a criminal offence. Thus, paintings that were suspected of having references to Bhutto’s hanging or political executions in general were labelled objectionable and disallowed from public showings. Likewise, the politically minded works of A R Nagori, Ijaz ul Hassan and Salima Hashmi were banned from state-sponsored exhibitions, because these addressed issues such as military dictatorship, political oppression, religious fundamentalism and suppression of women; problems that were present in the society, but were not often mentioned in the media or on public forums. For example, Nagori made reference to the alliance between the mullahs and the military in his painting “Junkies 2” (1985), and portrayed army oppression in his “Tamgha” (medal) from the same period. Likewise, Hashmi’s work “In Spite of Wrath, 2” (1987), which depicted faceless females, indicated the situation of women in the country. Both of these were officially censored.

The earliest incident of censoring visual art in Pakistan, however, was probably the rejection of Hassan’s painting titled “My Lai”, on the well-known Vietnam War massacre, from the national exhibition held in 1971 during the reign of another military dictator, General Yahya Khan. Ostensibly, the painting was not permitted in the exhibition because it was feared that the US government could be offended. In reaction, all of the other artists scheduled to take part in the exhibition threatened to withdraw their own works, thus forcing the authorities to allow “My Lai” in the show. Likewise, the paintings of Hashmi and Jamila Masood were refused entry in the national exhibition of 1981, on the reasoning that the former’s work had ‘political content’, while the latter’s canvas had a face resembling that of the recently executed Bhutto.

Habitual editing
This kind of censorship ended in August 1988, as Zia’s regime crashed along with his Hercules aircraft. But today, his policies have two lasting, visible impacts on the art and culture of Pakistan. First, they have generated the creation of a small number of private galleries (initially one in Lahore, two in Karachi and one in Islamabad), because some artists were unable to exhibit their works in state-run venues. (A similar phenomenon was witnessed in theatre, as a parallel theatre scene flourished in private spaces.) If on the one hand these were venues for artists who could not be shown in state-controlled spaces, these and other private galleries (established later) also encouraged a sense of commercialism in Pakistani art. Hence, freedom of expression and freedom of the market evolved side by side.

As Zia’s regime continued for 11 years, several groups of artists tried to protest the state policies. The last generation of politically conscious and active artists has included Jamal Shah and Akram Dost Baloch, who, along with a number of others, expressed their anger against atrocities through images of tortured individuals and contorted, often naked figures. Interestingly, these artists and those of the subsequent generation (such as Jamil Baloch and Rashid Rana) did not have to face serious problems of censorship or refusal to show their works. From the mid-1990s, after all, art had acquired a particular status – as precious items that could be collected, which also bestowed a power that proved stronger than the state intervention. Due to the rising price of works of art, the activity of art is today perceived as an important practice in the elitist world. Paradoxically, this limitation has provided a freedom from censorship, much like the serving of alcohol and watching banned movies are possible at Pakistan’s high-class parties. This new-found liberty has reduced art into an exclusive pursuit, however, often removing it from the public arena and interest.

Yet one can conclude that the long decade of Zia’s regime, which manipulated the concepts of morality and politics, ultimately has had a devastating effect on art in Pakistan which impacts to this day. The state no longer imposes strict rules regarding political subjects, nor is it particularly harsh on issues of morality; but many artists have imbibed the habit of self-censorship. Before putting their works to the test of official censorship, they start to scrutinise and edit their own content, imagery and intention. Hence, many artists begin their creative process with an already deep-set notion that nudes or overtly political themes might not be allowed for display, or that these could cause public anger and state wrath. Indeed, these ideas are embedded so strongly in the minds of today’s artists in Pakistan that the state’s reaction of tolerating ‘immoral’ subjects or politically motivated works at times comes as something of a surprise – rather than being seen as part and parcel to the creative person’s freedom of expression.

Similar to the story by Valenzuela referred to at the beginning, self-censorship in post-Zia Pakistan has captured the imagination and psyche of too many artists. Today, the state in Pakistan no longer demands that artists follow strict orders – the artists are already habitually complying with the spirit that would be behind such orders.

Quddus Mirza is an artist, art teacher, critic and independent curator based in Lahore.